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The Concept of Baseline Risk in Tort
Litigation
By VERN R. WALKER*
INTRODUCTION
Inherent in most current theories of what constitutes an unin-
tentional tort is an inchoate concept of "normal risk."' Generally,
plaintiffs are not allowed to recover compensation for injuries
resulting from the ordinary, daily risks faced by members of the
general population. A defendant may become liable, however, by
creating an "unreasonable risk" that brings about a plaintiff's
injury.2 Negligence is determined by applying the standard of con-
duct of a reasonable person under similar circumstances. 3 By con-
trast, the normal risks created by reasonable activity are part of
the danger inherent in living in society and are not a proper
predicate for awarding tort damages. 4
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University. Ph.D. 1975, University of Notre
Dame; J.D. 1980, Yale University. The author wishes to thank Lawrence Kessler and Wei-
Yann Tsai for their comments on a draft of this Article, and Christine Beggs, Andrea
Lichtenstein, Richard Petrucci, Jr., and Karen Walsh for their assistance in researching this
Article. The author also is grateful for the financial support provided by a research grant
from Hofstra University.
This Article addresses only those torts considered at law to be unintentional or
accidental.
2 E.g., REsTATmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 281 & cmt. e (1965) (noting that actor
liable if, among other things, actor's conduct is negligent-that is, the conduct "tends to
subject the interests of [the plaintiff] to an unreasonable risk of harm"); id. § 282.(defining
negligence as conduct that falls below standard established for protection of others "against
unreasonable risk of harm").
3 E.g., id. § 283.
4 On occasion, courts and commentators have expressly articulated the principle that
normal risks are not unreasonable. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821
F.2d 1438, 1443-44 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that decedent, who died of toxic shock
syndrome, did not act unreasonably in continuing to use tampons in disregard of package
warning after being reassured by her doctor that she did not have toxic shock syndrome),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Allman v. Holleman, 667 P.2d 296, 300 (Kan. 1983)
(holding, as a matter of law, that decedent was not contributorily negligent in taking birth
control pills pursuant to doctor's prescriptions, because "nearly all human acts carry with
them some degree of risk," and when that risk is slight enough so as to be commonly
disregarded, the standard of care is not violated); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
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When liability is determined by reference to the negligence
principle, for example, tort law does not require defendants to be
"insurers" against all risks, and provides a remedy only for injuries
traceable to unreasonable risks beyond the risks normally encoun-
tered. When tort law provides compensation without reference to
negligence, a notion of non-compensable normal risk is also at
work. Injuries traceable to risks from "ultrahazardous" or "ab-
normally dangerous" activities may be compensable in strict lia-
bility 5 but such risks and activities are identified only in contrast
to the "normally risky" activities in which people engage.6 In the
area of strict products liability, injuries due to normal risks faced
by users of non-defective products are not compensable by the
supplier. 7 Thus, even in areas where tort law invokes strict liability,
KEETON ON nm LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 170 (5th ed. 1984) ("Nearly all human acts, of
course, carry some recognizable but remote possibility of harm to another. No person...
drives a car without the risk of a broken steering gear or a heart attack. But these are not
unreasonable risks.").
See, e.g., Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 368 N.E.2d 24, 27, 30 (N.Y. 1977)
("With respect to strict liability it is not every dangerous activity which will establish
liability. It is only when, under the circumstances, an activity is abnormally dangerous that
the actors become legally responsible."); Peneschi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1,
4-11 (W.Va. 1982) (holding that when a person chooses to use an abnormally dangerous
instrumentality he is strictly liable without a showing of negligence for any injury proxi-
mately caused by that instrumentality); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
6 In addition, if the injury suffered is not the type of injury traceable to the abnormal
risk created by the activity, then strict liability generally does not apply. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1977) (limiting strict liability "to the kind of harm, the
possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous"); e.g., Peneschi, 295 S.E.2d
at 6 ("[T]he rule of strict liability applies only to that harm which is within the scope of
the abnormal risk upon which liability is based.").
Liability for injuries from normal risks (e.g., the risk of injury from falling objects),
even though encountered in abnormally dangerous activities (e.g., operating an explosives
manufacturing facility), is governed by the negligence principle, not strict liability. See, e.g.,
Herman v. Welland Chem., Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 823, 826 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (dismissing
absolute liability counts of volunteer firemen struck by car while directing traffic following
chemical spill on highway, although court assumed that doctrine of absolute liability could
be applied to shipment of chemicals); Harper v. Regency Dev. Co., 399 So. 2d 248, 253
(Ala. 1981) (stating that if someone trips over dynamite and breaks a leg, but no explosion
takes place, strict liability will not apply); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. e
(1977) (noting that pedestrian run over by truck transporting dynamite through city streets
not able to recover on strict liability).
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmt. i (1965) (predicating strict
liability on product being "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous," meaning that
"[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics"); see also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[L]iability may not be imposed merely because a product
involves some risk of harm or is not entirely safe for all uses. Products liability does not
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defendants are still not regarded as insurers against the normal
risks of life.
The policy of excluding from tort compensation those injuries
due to normal risks also underlies the causation requirement in a
tort cause of action, whether sounding in negligence or strict lia-
bility. The plaintiff must establish that the defendant actually
caused the injury-that is, that the injury did not result from risks
that the plaintiff otherwise would have encountered.8 Injuries not
caused by the defendant's activities or omissions are generally not
chargeable to the defendant.9 The causation requirement acts as an
additional means of ensuring that a defendant is not held liable
for injuries due to the normal risks that would have been present
regardless of the defendant's activities.
Perhaps because the concept of normal risk is so intuitive and
fundamental to tort law, the cases have not evolved a standard or
well-defined terminology. Normal risk has been referred to as the
"everyday" or "usual" risk associated with an activity or situa-
tion. 10 Such risks have been described as "pervasive," "common,"
mean that a seller is an insurer for all harm resulting from the use of his product." Product
is "defective" only if it is unreasonably dangerous, not simply dangerous.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
1 This is clearest when the concept of causation employed is "but for" causation, in
which the defendant's negligent act (for example) must be a necessary condition for the
plaintiff's injury. E.g., KEaroN Er AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 266. Essentially, had it not
been for the defendant's conduct, plaintiff would not have been injured. See infra text
accompanying notes 146-150.
The notion of a defendant not compensating for what would have normally happened
anyway is less clearly present in a "substantial factor" concept of causation, see KEETON
ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 266-68, which is sometimes applied when either of two causes
(only one of which is the defendant's responsibility) would have been sufficient to bring
about the injury. The concept of baseline risk should prove useful in clarifying what is
meant by the substantiality of a factor. See infra text accompanying note 151.
9 E.g., Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426, 430 (2d Cir. 1962) ("[I]f
the accident would have happened without defendant's negligent act, then such is not the
cause of it." (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FEIu3nr JAmEs, JR., THE LAw OF ToRTS §
20.2, at 1114 n.18 (1956))); Livingston v. Gribetz, 549 F. Supp. 238, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(holding that because an act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the
particular event would have occurred without it, no causation established where plaintiff
nurse could have contracted herpes simplex through various means under the circumstances,
regardless of defendant pediatrician's actions); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 432(1)
(1965) (actor's negligent conduct "not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another
if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent").
10 See, e.g., Jackson v. Kansas City, 680 P.2d 877, 892 (Kan. 1984) (holding collision
between fire trucks on emergency runs not, as a matter of law, a "usual risk" of a fire
fighter's employment); McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 266 A.2d 284, 296 (N.J. 1970)
(distinguishing the "ordinary and usual risks" of diving and swimming inherent in the
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or "general."'" They might also be referred to as the "natural"
risks of life, or the risks associated with the "accidental," "ran-
dom," or "chance" events inherent in life.
Such variation in terminology, however, also reflects an impre-
cision in judicial thinking about normal risk-an imprecision that
has been tolerable because the rationales for deciding cases have
been constructed with such concepts as "unreasonable risk," "ab-
normally dangerous activity," "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous," and "cause." But as serviceable as these front line
concepts have been, their usefulness has been severely tested by
the complexity of modern cases, especially those involving scientific
theories about risk determination and scientific information about
normal risk. The advent, for example, of tort claims involving
latent injuries' 2 or "lost chances" for benefit,' 3 and the increased
sport, and any "extraordinary hazards" created by the defendant); Frank B. Cross, Beyond
Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance Threshold on Regulatable Risks of
Cancer, 35 EMoRY L.J. 1 (1986) (discussing "average" health risks).
11 See, e.g., Ek v. Herrington, 738 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Idaho 1990) (noting that
hauling of lumber creates a number of "common risks," as distinct from "peculiar risks"),
aff'd, 939 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1991); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Hutto, 401 So. 2d 1277, 1281
(Miss. 1981) (describing the "general risk" of employment).
2 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1192, 1204-05 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding that district court properly held defendant liable for injuries caused by
leaching of waste chemicals from landfill into drinking water, but requiring that damages
for mere increased risk of future disease be excluded unless a reasonable medical certainty
existed that the relevant harm would actually result); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785
F.2d 79, 81-83 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that district court properly excluded evidence of
present increased risk of possible future cancer when plaintiff that was diagnosed as having
pleural thickening of the lungs did not present sufficient evidence that he would more likely
than not develop cancer in the future); Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d
1156 (4th Cir. 1986) (disallowing plaintiff that allegedly had contracted asbestosis from
introducing evidence of cancer risk because he could not establish a reasonable probability
that cancer would develop); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740,
834 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), (tentatively approving fairness of settlement, partly because, if the
incremental incidence of soft-tissue sarcoma among those exposed to Agent Orange is equal
to or less than the incidence in the general population not exposed to Agent Orange, and
if there is no meaningful causal proof specific to particular plaintiffs, "virtually no plaintiff
would be able to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her cancer is
attributable to the Agent, Orange rather than being part of the 'background' level of cancer
in the population as a whole"), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984) (addressing
plaintiffs' claim that waste material from processing of uranium ore placed in and around
foundation of their home exposed them to levels of radiation greatly in excess of those
permitted by governmental regulatory standards and dramatically increased their risk of
cancer).
1 ,See, e.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Mich. 1990) (holding
that compensable injury from medical malpractice includes loss of opportunity of avoiding
physical harm, even though the opportunity lost was less than even); Hamil v. Bashline,
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pressures to regard risk itself as a compensable injury, 4 have
created the need to rethink and refine such concepts as "unreason-
able risk" and "proximate cause."' 5 Such cases also create pressure
to reexamine the relationship between scientific evidence of risk
and such legally required factual elements as negligence and cau-
sation.
The objective of this Article is not to resolve all the substantive
issues raised by such difficult cases, let alone to propose redesigns
of such legal concepts as negligence and causation. The objective
is necessarily more limited: it is to provide an important part of
the conceptual foundation for undertaking those tasks. This Article
examines what is meant, or should be meant, by "normal risk,"
and how to determine what the "normal risks" are in a given
situation.
This Article proposes a new legal concept' "baseline risk.' ' 6
The objective is to design a concept of baseline risk that should
prove useful in tort litigation by clarifying what is meant by "nor-
mal risk" and providing a well-defined concept upon which a
reevaluation of traditional tort concepts might rest. A more precise
notion of "normal risk" may assist in improving the designs of
such traditional tort concepts as "unreasonable risk," "abnormally
dangerous activity," "product defect," and "causation"-concepts
that are stubbornly vague in increasingly unproductive ways.
392 A.2d 1280, 1286-88 (Pa. 1978) (holding that when expert witness testified that if hospital
emergency room had employed proper treatment, decedent would have had substantial
chance of surviving heart attack, jury should decide whether the increased risk due to
defendant's actions was a substantial factor in producing the harm); Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 486-87 (Wash. 1983) (allowing cause of action to be tried
when plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that misdiagnosis of lung cancer proximately
caused a 14 percentage-point reduction in plaintiff's chances of survival even though plaintiff
at all relevant times would have had less than 50% chance of survival absent misdiagnosis).
For other cases allowing causation to be found on proof that the defendant's conduct
increased the risk of death by decreasing the chances of survival, see McBride v. United
States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966);
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). See also Joseph
H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-
existing Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
1" See cases cited supra note 12.
"1 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass
Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269, 270-73 (explaining that toxic tort cases, due to their
complex medical and scientific issues of proof, present the legal system with the most
difficult dilemmas, which traditional tort doctrines, with their relatively simple models of
causation and liability, are ill-equipped to address).
16 The term "baseline risk" is used exclusively to refer to the specific concept herein
defined, thus enabling a contrast between the new concept and the inchoate notions of
"normal risk" that pervade traditional tort law.
1991-92]
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Moreover, given the increasing importance of scientific evidence
in tort litigation, a concept of baseline risk will be particularly
useful to the extent that it clarifies what scientific evidence is
relevant to determining normal risk in a given situation. One
practical benefit that might be derived is a clearer basis upon which
to decide summary judgment motions, evidentiary motions in lim-
ine, and motions for directed verdict. It is hoped, therefore, that
the concept of baseline risk will enable more efficient utilization
of scientific evidence in tort litigation.
Finally, the interplay between tort and statutory bases for legal
remedy, and the increased importance of the concept of risk in
both judicial and regulatory decision making, make a single, rea-
sonably precise concept of baseline risk desirable.1 7 As defined
here, the concept of baseline risk should provide part of the foun-
dation for a conceptual bridge between tort theories of compen-
sation for past injuries and statutory and regulatory programs that
prospectively manage health, safety, and environmental risk. Such
a foundation is needed before a unified theory of accident law can
be developed.
This Article is organized into three major parts. Part I discusses
the concept of risk in general and sets forth a basic formulation
of the concept of baseline risk.18 Part II discusses several major
kinds of uncertainty or error usually associated with baseline risk.
That Part also explores a basic paradox (the "baseline risk para-
dox") associated with determining specific causation in particular
cases and suggests that this paradox is the conceptual problem
underlying both "lost chance" cases and the "indeterminate plain-
tiff" problem.19 Part III discusses appropriate uses of the concept
of baseline risk in tort litigation, focusing particularly on its rele-
17 Although statutes and regulations intended to protect health, safety, and the envi-
ronment are not the topic of this Article, it is worth noting that many of such laws also
rely on an implicit concept of normal or "background" risk. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, 136(bb), 136a(c)(5) (1988)
(regulating pesticides so as to avoid "unreasonable adverse effects," "unreasonable risk");
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084, 2057 (1988) (regulating
"banned hazardous products" by reference to "unreasonable risk of injury"); Toxic Subst-
ances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671, 2603(a), 2604(f), 2605(a) (1988) (reg-
ulating chemicals with respect to "unreasonable risk of injury"); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k, 6903(5) (1988) (defining "hazardous
waste" in terms of, in part, "an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible,
or incapacitating reversible, illness").
11 See infra part I.
19 See infra part II.
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vance to certain factual elements of traditional causes of action,
as well as the proper allocation of the burdens of production and
persuasion on baseline risk.20
I. THE CONCEPT OF BASELINE RISK: BASIC FORMuLATION
This Part introduces the basic elements of "risk," applies these
elements to tort litigation, and arrives at a basic formulation of
baseline risk.
A. The Elements of Risk
"Risk" is generally defined as the probability or likelihood of
suffering harm from a hazard. 2' A "hazard," in turn, is any action
or substance that can cause harm. 22 It is common, however, also
to refer to the harm that can be caused as a hazard.2 Thus, the
word "hazard" is used to refer either to the cause of the harm
(the external agent) or to the resulting harm (the type of injury).
The "hazard event" is the accident itself: the occurrence or event
consisting of the harm-causing agent's actually causing the harm.
An example of a hazard event is the ingestion of a toxic chemical;
either the chemical itself or the resulting toxic reaction could be
referred to as the hazard.
Risk theory-and probability theory itself-originated in part
as a study of gambling or games of chance, 24 which still provide
clear examples of what is meant by risk. Risk can be measured by
the expected loss associated with the possibility that a hazard event
might occur (i.e., the probability of the hazard event occurring
20 See infra part III.
2, See, e.g., JOHN J. CoHassEN & VINCENT T. CovLo, RISK ANALYSIS: A GUIDE TO
PInCIPLES AND METHODS FOR ANALYZINo HEALTH AND ENvnomENrAL RISKS 6-7 (1989)
(defining "risk" as "the possibility of suffering harm from a hazard"); NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, RISK AssEssMENT IN TE FEDERAL GOvERNmENT: MANAaGNG THE PROCESS 18 (1983)
(defining "risk assessment" as "the characterization of the potential adverse health effects
of human exposures to environmental hazards"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1961 (1986) (defining risk as "possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage, or
destruction," "the chance of loss or the perils to the subject matter of insurance covered
by a contract," and "the degree of probability of such a loss").
'2 COHRSSEN & COVELLO, supra note 21, at 1.
73 See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at
1041 (defining hazard as "a thing or condition that might operate against success or safety,"
"a possible source of peril, danger, duress, or difficulty").
R. DUNCAN LUCE & HowARD RAiFFA, GA Es AND DECISIONS 19 (1957); STEPHEN
M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS 62 (1986).
1991-921
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multiplied by the amount of the loss if it occurs). Selecting "heads"
as the winning side of the coin converts tossing "tails" into a
hazard event. The expected loss in the toss of a fair coin on which
a bet has been placed is the probability that the toss will result in
showing the side of the coin ("heads" or "tails") not chosen by
the gambler, times the amount wagered.
Colloquially, many say that a significant risk associated with
driving seventy miles per hour on a wet, curved road is losing
control of the vehicle (the hazard event), but that the risk is "less"
if the road is dry and straight. Salmonella poisoning (the effect of
ingesting salmonella) is "a risk" run from eating certain under-
cooked foods; the magnitude of the risk depends on many factors.
In this sense, "a risk" is a hazard event that has some non-zero
or non-negligible probability of occurring.2 When certain conduct
is described as "risky," that usually means that engaging in it
creates or incurs a non-zero probability of some hazard event
occurring. When a situation is described as "risky," the label
ordinarily means that the circumstances are such that being (or
acting) in that situation incurs some risk-that is, has associated
with it a hazard event with a non-zero probability of occurrence.
Determination of risk can be approached qualitatively or quan-
titatively. Whether or not certain activities or situations have cer-
tain risks associated with them is a qualitative, "yes-or-no" matter. 6
Driving an automobile has certain risks associated with it that
staying home in bed (normally) does not; eating uncooked shellfish
25 The distinction between a "non-zero" probability and a "non-negligible" proba-
bility can be important. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1109, 1122
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the FDA cannot allow use of a color additive as "safe" if
the color additive fails to meet the applicable "Delaney Clause," even if the additive
presents only a de minimis or "trivial" risk to humans), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
For purposes of this Article, however, and in much of everyday usage, the distinction is
not important, in the sense that an extremely small, negligible risk is often regarded as not
a "real risk" at all.
Fortunately, a determination of the quantitative threshold of probability for identifying
a "real risk," as opposed to a "non-risk," is not necessary in this Article. This is part of
the problem of defining such qualifiers as "safe" and "de minimis risk," which is a
problem currently haunting such regulatory agencies as the FDA. The analysis in this Article
does not depend on being able to identify the exact line in close cases. Moreover, there is
no reason to think that a single line should be drawn for all purposes: depending on the
potential costs and benefits involved, and the degree of uncertainty about risks, a rare event
that is dismissed as negligible in some circumstances may well be considered a serious risk
in others. Such determinations of "real risk" are ideally suited for jury determination.
16 See COMHSMEN & CovELLo, supra note 21, at 6 (defining "hazard identification");
NATiONAL REsEAR CH CouiC , supra note 21, at 19 (same).
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has risks that bungee jumping does not. A particular chemical can
either cause a given health effect (e.g., cancer) or it cannot. Risk
identification, in this qualitative sense, is a matter of identifying
the relevant hazard (harmful agent or resulting harm) and deter-
mining whether there is any non-negligible possibility of its occur-
rence.
More difficulty enters if the inquiry moves beyond mere qual-
itative identification of risk into ranking risks or measuring them
quantitatively. This is usually done for the purpose of comparing
risks or balancing risks against potential benefits. The least contro-
versial part of risk measurement is determining the probability of
occurrence. This Article assumes a classical or relative frequency
interpretation of probability statements and assumes that the stan-
dard mathematical theory of probability (so interpreted) is an
adequate means of measuring the likelihood of a hazard event
occurring. 27 For the same harm or loss, therefore, a 400% chance
of its occurring creates twice the risk that a 20% chance would
create. If all else is equal, risks can be measured and compared on
the basis of their probability of occurrence.
Once measurements and comparisons are attempted beyond the
level of mere probability of occurrence, however, more serious
conceptual problems arise. Quantifying expected loss, 28 ranking
different types of harm or loss, or comparing the harms caused to
different people, for example, are problems for which there is no
consensus on measurement. To weigh a 50070 loss of mobility in
one person's right arm against the destruction of another's personal
property involves principles that are problematic, and factors that
vary from person to person, from circumstance to circumstance. 29
27The concept of baseline risk could be defined using a "subjectivist" or "personalist"
interpretation of probability statements, and Bayesian inferential statistics could be employed
throughout the Article. See generally Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward
a Taxonomy of Scientific Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 CoNN. L. Rv. 567, 618-24
(1991). Doing so should not change any of the basic analysis or conclusions. Therefore, in
order to explicate the concept of baseline risk in the most straightforward way, this Article
uses the somewhat simpler, classical, "frequentist" interpretation, with which most readers
are familiar. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
n This Article need not explore the extremely difficult topic of proper valuation of
injury, including economic and noneconomic losses (e.g., lost wages and suffering, respec-
tively). It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the jury system is a procedure for
arriving at such valuations.
The right side of Judge Learned Hand's celebrated inequality requires a calculation
of the value of the expected loss-in that case, an estimate of the magnitude of the risk
associated with not having a bargee on board the barge "Anna C." See United States v.
1991-92]
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Although such problems might not be avoidable were this Article
to analyze such concepts as "unreasonable risk," the concept of
baseline risk is definable without entering that particular swamp.
In analyzing baseline risk for purposes of tort litigation, two
issues must. be clarified. The first issue is how to identify the
hazard event that is relevant to the litigation. The second is how
to identify the probability of occurrence of such a hazard event.
After a brief discussion of these two issues, it will be possible to
formulate, at least in a basic way, the concept of baseline risk.
B. The Hazard Event in Tort Litigation
Tort litigation departs in a fundamental way from the model
of decision making in which a decider must take into account a
proliferating set of possible outcomes to each of a range of possible
decisions.30 For example, in the game of draw poker a player may
decide to draw additional cards, not draw cards, or "fold," and
she may bet or "check." Various combinations of these possible
actions can have one of many possible outcomes, depending on
what other players do and the value of the hands that they hold.
Another example of this normal, prospective model is a regulatory
agency whose statutory mandate is to identify hazards associated
with its actions. 31 Tort litigation, however, is generally concerned
neither with identifying possible hazard events in general, nor with
determining their prospective probabilities of occurrence. In a sim-
plified case involving a single injury to a plaintiff, the relevant
hazard is the specific kind of injury already suffered by the plain-
tiff, and the relevant hazard event is the plaintiff's accident. Other
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (suggesting that negligence occurs
when the "burden of adequate precautions," B, is less than or equal to the "gravity of the
resulting injury," L, multiplied by the probability of the injury's occurring, P: B :s PL).
For the mere existence of some risk, however, all that is required is a non-zero or non-
negligible likelihood of a loss or injury.
30 See, e.g., HEI,mAN CHim Fr & LiNcoLN E. MosEs, ELm ENTARY DEcISION THEORY
2-9 (1959); LucE & RAFFA, supra note 24, at 276-77.
31 The EPA, for example, in the registration process for a pesticide under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-13 6y (1988), takes into account
possible detrimental effects to human health and the environment. See id. §§ 136(j),
136a(c)(5)(C)-(D); see also 40 C.F.R. Part 158 (1991) (requiring an applicant for registration
to submit data addressing such questions as the human toxicology and environmental fate
of the product). As part of a regulatory risk assessment, the Agency, before registering a
pesticide, attempts to determine whether exposure to an agent in the pesticide can cause an
increase in the incidence of an adverse health condition. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCM,
supra note 21, at 19.
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kinds of hazards and hazard events are usually regarded as irrele-
vant to the liability of the defendant.3 2
Tort litigation, unlike regulatory decision making, has the ad-
vantage of being able to focus the factual inquiry retrospectively,
by determining the chain of events and risks relevant to the actual
injury suffered by the plaintiff. The inquiry can focus upon a
particular injury (e.g., broken leg, lung cancer), and often upon a
particular hazard event (e.g., automobile collision, breathing con-
taminated air).33 Tort analysis works "backward" in time, pro-
ceeding from the injury to the accident, and from the accident to
the defendant's actions and the associated risk that those actions
could bring about that injury. The trier of fact in tort litigation
normally considers only those circumstances, actions, factors, and
risks that are relevant to the particular injury actually suffered.
Such an analysis can proceed relatively efficiently, especially when
compared to open-ended, prospective fact-finding.
The nature of the plaintiff's actual injury and of the accident,
therefore, are the major factors in determining the relevance to the
litigation of particular risks. Tort law seeks to compensate the
plaintiff for actual injuries due to unreasonable risks created by
the defendant, not to compensate for injuries that would have been
suffered regardless of the defendant's actions.3 4 To the extent,
therefore, that liability rests on responsibility for the creation of
risks, the risks that are relevant to the litigation are determined
solely by the kind of hazard and hazard event associated with the
plaintiff's injury. The only actions of the defendant that are usually
directly relevant to the case are those actions that could have
contributed to the risk of the particular kind of injury suffered by
the plaintiff.
32 Other hazard events may be relevant to the measurement of damages. In determining
the appropriate amount of damages, the jury and court may properly take into account the
actual life expectancy of the plaintiff prior to the accident, which is a unitary measure of
the plaintiff's risk of death from all kinds of hazards. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
TH LAW OF REMEDiEs 571-73 (1973). The discussion here, however, sets to one side
considerations of damages, and addresses rather the assessment of liability for the injury
suffered by the plaintiff.
" It is sometimes possible to identify the relevant harm, but not the specific hazard
event. If a person is ill in recurring ways, there might be good reason to think that the
illness is being caused by exposure to some environmental agent, but very little indication
as to what that environmental agent is or when the person was exposed to it.
4 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 901 & cmt. a (1979) (limiting damages
to those that tend to carry out the stated purposes of tort law).
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C. Likelihood of Occurrence
The mathematical theory of probability is generally used to
define what is meant by the "likelihood of occurrence" of an
event.35 This Article presupposes the workability of a frequentist
interpretation of probability, 36 in which the probability of an event
is the expected, long-run frequency of occurrence of that event
relative to the same or similar circumstances.37 The likelihood or
probability of a particular hazard event occurring, therefore, is the
relative frequency with which one would expect that hazard event
to occur in the relevant circumstances. In the circumstances of
throwing a fair die, the probability of throwing a "2" is 1/6: that
is, in the long run, we expect that approximately 1/6 of the total
number of throws would result in a "2." Similarly, the probability
of a rare complication to a particular kind of surgery might be 1/
1,000-by which we mean that the complication is expected to
occur about once for each 1,000 operations performed.
In the tort context, the probability of the plaintiff's injury can
be defined as the ratio of two sets of events. The first set of events
is defined by the hazard or hazard event itself, to be referred to
as the "hazard set." The hazard set is the set of occurrences of
the type of injury (hazard) or accident (hazard event) suffered by
the plaintiff (e.g., death by complications of surgery, salmonella
poisoning). 38 The second set of events, to be referred to as the
"reference set," is the set of all possible outcomes in the situation
or circumstances in which the plaintiff was injured. 39 The reference
set includes the hazard set as a subset, but also includes other
hazards that did not eventuate under the particular circumstances,
as well as any outcomes that are harmless and do not include
injury to the plaintiff.
11 For discussions of alternative interpretations for the elements of a probability
function (such as propositions or sentences, instead of events or sets of events), see, for
example, HENRY E. KBuRo, JR., PROBABILIrY AND INDucTvE LOGIC 12-13, 54-76 (1970).
36 For surveys of alternative interpretations for probability statements themselves (such
as logical or subjective interpretations, instead of a frequency interpretation), see COLIN
HOWSON & PETER URBACH, SCmNNTIFIC REASONING: THE BAYESIAN APPROACH 21-23 (1989);
KYBURG, supra note 35, at 29-76; Max Black, Probability, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHItosoPHY 464, 473-78 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
1, See, e.g., CHERNOFn & Mosas, supra note 30, at 89; KYBURG, supra note 35, at 40-
53; Black, supra note 36, at 475-76.
31 In the example of throwing the die, the hazard set consists of throwing a "2."
39 In the case of the die, the set of all possible outcomes has 6 members: throwing a
result from "1" to "6."
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The probability of the plaintiff's injury under the circumstances
in which the accident occurred (that is, the probability of the
occurrence of the harm or hazard event in the situation) is the
expected, long-run relative frequency with which that type of haz-
ard event and injury would occur in the same or similar circum-
stances. Thus, in determining the likelihood of occurrence of the
plaintiff's injury, the number of total outcomes in a long series of
"trials" in similar circumstances is the denominator of the prob-
ability ratio, while the frequency of occurrence of the harm or
hazard in that series is the numerator. The resulting probability is
the likelihood of the plaintiff's injury or accident relative to the
situation.
In this ratio, the denominator (the number of total outcomes)
is simply the number of "trials" (for example, throws of the die).
However, counting the number of trials presupposes that we have
sufficiently well-defined criteria for what will count as a trial. In
torts, the criteria for what will count as a trial are sometimes
referred to implicitly in the phrase "same or similar circum-
stances."' 4 Those same or similar circumstances constitute the "sit-
uation" in which the accident occurred-whether highway
conditions, an occupational situation, or a hospital surgical setting.
In determining the baseline risk for the plaintiff's injury, the trier
of fact should restrict consideration to situations similar to those
in which the plaintiff found herself just prior to the accident, and
should estimate the likelihood of the injury occurring in such
circumstances. The relevant circumstances surrounding the acci-
dent, including those acts of the defendant or circumstances created
by the defendant that allegedly imposed an incremental risk, con-
stitute the "reference situation," or simply "the situation. ' 41
40 In determining negligence, for example, the jury is usually instructed to take into
account all the relevant circumstances. See, e.g., CA~iFORNLA JuRY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL,
BooK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS [BAJI] § 3.10 (7th ed. 1986). Of course, this
instruction is given when asking the jury to decide what a reasonably prudent person in the
defendant's position would do in the same or similar circumstances, and the attention is on
the defendant's situation. This Article, by contrast, focuses on the set of same or similar
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff to determine the baseline risk for the plaintiff's
injury. The practical difference between the two concepts is minimal in the many situations
in which the defendant's conduct occurs in the same situation as the plaintiff's injury (such
as in an automobile collision case). The distinction is more significant when the defendant's
relevant actions are spatially or temporally removed from the occurrence of the plaintiff's
injury.
41 In contrast with the hazard and reference sets, which refer to types of outcomes
(e.g., possible values on the die), the reference situation is comparable to the throwing of
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Estimating a frequency of occurrence for the hazard event
relative to the reference situation presupposes that hazard events
can be reliably distinguished from non-hazard events, and that
reference situations can be distinguished from non-reference situa-
tions. Statements about risk and relative frequency of occurrence,
therefore, presuppose the possibility of a "count": a process by
which outcomes and situations are sorted into categories. 42 Unless
there is consistency and consensus on such sorting, the count of
the hazard occurrences as a proportion of the possible outcomes
in the situation will change depending on who does the counting,
or how an occurrence happens to be classified. Thus, in order to
arrive at agreement oil the likelihood for the occurrence of a hazard
event, there must be agreement on how to classify "similar hazard
events" and "similar circumstances." 43
To the extent that valid and reliable classification of hazard
events and reference situations can be achieved, and the instances
in each outcome set can be counted, an expected frequency of the
the die in a certain manner (e.g., shaking the die blindly in a cup and throwing it against
the wall, or selecting a value to face upward and carefully releasing the die a mere inch
above the table surface). The reference situation is the set of circumstances that includes
all factors that can affect the outcome.
An alternative definition for the "reference situation" would be the same or similar
circumstances, but excluding those acts of the defendant that are negligent. Such a definition
would be practically unworkable, however, because one could not identify the reference
situation without first deciding which acts of the defendant were negligent. Moreover, one
would generally not know whether other (non-litigated) instances of similar circumstances
involved any negligence, so it would be difficult to generate reliable statistics about the
relative frequency of certain outcomes in the reference situation. It seems preferable,
therefore, to define the reference situation as the set of all circumstances in which the
plaintiff was situated, including any involvement the defendant may have had, but leaving
open the question whether negligence was in fact involved.
"Baseline risk," as opposed to the "reference situation," will be defined to exclude
consideration of the defendant's negligent acts. See infra part I.D. The reference situation,
however, is defined as including all relevant risk factors, including any acts that may have
been negligent.
4 Statistical scientists refer generally to "classification" or "measurement"-the proc-
ess of classifying cases or "observations" into measurement categories, the results of which
are recorded as data. See generally Walker, supra note 27, at 580-88. A principal objective
behind measurement techniques is to achieve a procedure that will consistently produce the
same classification of the same items or situations. Such consistency in classification is
referred to as "reliability." E.g., EDWiN E. GIsELu ET AL., MEaSUREmENT THmORY FOR
TrH BEHAWAviot SciENcEs 184, 191 (1981). Another objective is to produce "valid" classi-
fication methods-that is, measurement techniques that actually measure what we think
they measure. E.g., GHIsELLI ET AL., supra, at 266; HERMAN J. LOETHER & DONALD G.
McTAVISH, DESCRPTIvE AND INFERENTIAL STATIsTIcs: AN INTRODUCTION 14, 32 (2d ed.
1980).




accident relative to the reference situation can be determined. In a
medical malpractice case, for example, the condition of the patient,
together with the nature of the operation being performed, may
define the reference situation. The possible outcomes for the patient
might be sorted into two categories: death due to related causes
within five years and survival for five years or more. If data exist
on a representative set of such situations, an estimate of the ex-
pected, long-run relative frequency of death within five years for
this kind of situation can be made.44 Such a relative frequency is
a ratio of deaths-within-five-years to all outcomes in the total
number of situations studied and can be expressed as a relative
frequency (e.g., 14 such deaths out of 124 cases), a proportion
(14/124, or 0.1129), or a percentage (11.29%). This would be an
estimate of the likelihood of occurrence of the harm (death within
5 years) given the reference situation.
D. A Basic Formulation of Baseline Risk
As stated at the outset, the concept of baseline risk is being
designed to be useful in implementing the principle that injuries
4 For a discussion of sampling uncertainty, see infra part II.C. One of the important
functions of juries is to "intuit," in a non-systematic, non-quantitative manner, the "normal
risks" associated with everyday situations, without the necessity for expert testimony or
other specialized instruction. If a case involves an automobile collision on a straight, dry,
well-marked paved road, in daylight, caused by the defendant's automobile crossing the
centerline, the jury does not need expert guidance to infer that the normal risks associated
with driving in such a situation are extremely small absent some additional factor, such as
the defendant's negligence or a defect in the defendant's automobile. In a medical mal-
practice case, by contrast, the jury is not expected to possess a collective set of experiences
from which it can infer an expected frequency of injury in similar circumstances. In such
cases, the jury is not allowed to estimate, without expert assistance, the normal risks
associated with the situation in which the injury occurred.
Another illustration of the important role of juries is provided by cases in which it is
inclear which factors should comprise the baseline risk. For example, in McMillan v. State
-iighway Commission, 393 N.W.2d 332, 332-40 (Mich. 1986), the issue was whether placing
on-energy-absorbing utility poles within three feet of the traveled portion of the highway
reated unreasonable risks for motorists. An alternative description of the issue is whether
ich poles should be regarded as part of the baseline risk of driving on the highway (and
hether courts should decide this issue of baseline risk as a matter of law, or whether they
tould allow juries to decide on the facts of each case). The identification of the baseline
;k has been traditionally a task for the jury. Juries have been helped in the task by the
Formal but general requirement (except in res ispa loquitur cases) that the plaintiff must
firmatively argue what alternative, non-negligent conduct the defendant should have
gaged in. See infra note 145 (noting that many courts require plaintiffs to produce
dence of an alternative, non-defective product design in cases where design defect is
-ged). Thus, in choosing to argue whether the utility poles involved in the accident should
,e been placed six feet from the road, should have been designed differently, or should
'e been eliminated by under-grounding the utility lines, the plaintiff is in fact urging on
jury a conception of acceptable baseline risks in the situation.
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resulting from the normal risks of life are not compensable because
they are part of the danger inherent in living in society. "Baseline
risk" will be defined as the risk of occurrence of the plaintiff's
injury or accident in the same or similar circumstances, but in the
absence of any act of the defendant that in fact created an addi-
tional, unreasonable risk of the injury or accident. The baseline
risk is, therefore, the relevant risk in the reference situation due to
all factors other than the defendant's negligence.4 It is the inherent,
relevant risk even in the absence of the defendant's negligent acts
or omissions. For example, in the malpractice situation, the base-
line risk is the normal risk associated with undergoing the same
kind of operation, under similar circumstances, when no malprac-
tice occurs.4 By definition, therefore, the total risk of the plain-
tiff's injury present in the reference situation is equal to the sum
of the baseline risk and any incremental, unreasonable risk created
by the defendant.
When the plaintiff contends that the defendant surgeon per-
formed the operation "negligently," the plaintiff is asserting, in
part, that the defendant performed some act, or failed to perform
some act, that increased the risk to the plaintiff over the baseline
risk associated with the operation. That incremental risk-the in-
crease in risk due to the malpractice-is not part of the baseline
risk: the baseline risk is the inherent risk in the reference situation
absent the incremental risk created by the defendant's negligent acl
or omission. Traditional tort law has focused attention on th(
negligent act of the defendant, whereas the concept of baseline ris
focuses attention on the risks created by all relevant causal factor
other than the defendant's negligence.
Illustrations of the relevance of baseline risk to causes of actio
sounding in negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and products li
bility will be discussed in Part III. The objective at this point
simply to provide a basic formulation of the concept of baselih
risk. Before exploring the usefulness of that concept in particul
41 For purposes of exposition, this Article will refer to the defendant's "negli
act" or "negligence" as shorthand for "an act that created an additional, unreason
risk of the plaintiff's injury or accident." As will become clear in Part III.A., howe
the concept of baseline risk is broadly defined, so as to be relevant not only to neglig
causes of action, but also to actions in strict liability, products liability, and nuisance
example.
In the collision situation, the baseline risk is the risk of physical injury di
collision in the absence of the defendant's negligence. In most collision cases, the ba.,
risk is negligible and therefore ignored in the litigation. See supra note 44.
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tort areas, however, this basic understanding of the concept will
be refined by examining the major kinds of uncertainty that are
associated with trying to apply the concept. 47
II. TYPES OF UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED wrm BASELINE RISK
According to the basic formulation, baseline risk is an inte-
grated function of all those risk factors inherent in the reference
situation that are relevant to the plaintiff's injury, with the excep-
tion of the relevant risk created by the defendant's negligent acts
or omissions.4 Once the concept of baseline risk is defined, a
number of important questions arise concerning the application of
the concept and the uncertainty normally associated with determin-
ing baseline risk. Examining these difficulties will increase under-
standing of the concept itself. This Part of the Article attempts to
refine the concept by discussing the kinds of uncertainty typically
associated with estimating baseline risk.
A. Conceptual and Measurement Uncertainty
As previously indicated,49 the determination of a probability of
occurrence for a hazard involves counting its relative frequency of
occurrence given the reference situation.5 0 In order to identify
frequency of occurrence, sufficiently valid and reliable criteria for
identifying instances of the hazard set and instances of the reference
situation must be available. If the analysis undercounts the hazard
instances or overcounts the reference instances, it will underesti-
- Some readers may wish to turn directly to Part III to survey possible applications
of the concept in torts contexts, using only the basic formulation presented thus far, before
returning to Part II to refine their understanding of the concept.
48 Scientists are rarely interested in bundling causally complex systems into a single
package-for example, what in this paper and often in the law of torts is referred to as
"the situation." But in torts, the courts are not acting as investigative scientists, and it is
often sufficient for legal purposes to divide the world of possible causes into only two
parts: the defendant's negligent act and "other" risk factors.
For the sake of clarity, this Article considers only a two-party paradigm of a tort
lawsuit, with a single plaintiff and a single defendant.
41 See supra part I.C.
50 This exposition will usually refer simply to the probability of the "occurrence of
the hazard," when what is meant more precisely is "the occurrence of an instance of the
hazard set," whether that set is defined by reference to the hazard event (the accident) or
the hazard itself (meaning either the distinguishing kind of harm or the distinguishing
characteristic of the harming agent). See supra part I.A.
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mate the likelihood of occurrence of the hazard." On the other
hand, overcounting hazard events or undercounting reference in-
stances will result in overestimating the likelihood of occurrence.
Central to the task of counting accurately, therefore, is the ability
to classify events correctly and consistently as either hazard events
or reference situations.
In the case of medical malpractice, the set of all similar situa-
tions would be the set of operations of that type being performed
by comparably licensed or trained surgeons on patients with med-
ical conditions similar to those of the patient. 52 With respect to
certain kinds of reference situations, there may be statistics avail-
able for average survival rates associated with particular operations
based on the measurable condition of the patient.5 3 Such survival
statistics typically would be estimates based on the performed
operations that have been documented and followed, which would
exclude from consideration those similar operations that were per-
formed but not documented, or for which no follow-up data were
reported.
In most tort cases, however, frequency data about the reference
situation and the hazard events relevant to the tort suit do not
exist. The first difficulty is the conceptual uncertainty over how to
identify the relevant variables.5 4 Although a generic description of
the kind of harm suffered by the plaintiff (e.g., death or poisoning)
"1 Cf. ABRAHAm M. LLmENFELD & DAVID E. LIL1ENFELD, FoUNDATIONS oF EPMEM-
OLOGy 84-90 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing possible sources of artifactual error in mortality trends
due to errors in the numerator or denominator of mortality rates).
52 The judicial rule that the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is the
conduct of a reasonably competent practitioner, see, e.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123,
129 (D.C. Cir. 1977), effectively requires that the risks created by reasonably competent
practitioners be within the baseline risk. The focus of this Article, however, is not on
criteria for unreasonable risk, negligence, or medical malpractice, but on the concept of
baseline risk.
11 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 475 (Wash. 1983)
(Over a span of 6 months, the decedent's possibility of 5-year survival with accurate
diagnosis of lung cancer decreased from 39% to 25%.).
4 In developing a notion of relevant risk based on the hazard or hazard event, it is
useful to employ the terminology of the statistical scientist. A "variable" is the property
or characteristic of things or events that is the basis for sorting them into categories, or
classifying them. See generally Walker, supra note 27, at 576-79. Balls might be classified
by color (the variable) into many categories (e.g., black, red, white, etc.) or into only two
(e.g., black and non-black). Similarly, types of hazard are classified by means of variables
(e.g., variables addressing the identity or toxicity of a chemical agent or the health status
of the plaintiff). In order to determine the baseline risk of an injury occurring, it is first




may not present problems of definition, there may be no consensus
on how to characterize the reference situation.-5 In most tort cases
in which expert testimony is needed,5 6 the question is whether the
variables for which data exist can be used as sufficiently descriptive
of the plaintiff's situation and hazard set.f
One manifestation of the importance of estimating relative
frequency in a lawsuit is that opposing attorneys often contend for
alternative descriptions of the hazard event or of the relevant
circumstances. For example, inclusion of more particularities or
details in the description of the hazard event is likely to decrease
its probability of occurrence, whereas a more general description
is likely to increase its probability of occurrence.5 8 Similarly, a
more general description of the relevant circumstances would tend
to increase the count of similar situations, which would tend to
increase the number and types of nonhazard outcomes and lower
the probability of the hazard event. A narrower description of the
situation would tend to increase the probability of the hazard event.
How trial attorneys define the hazard and reference situation,
therefore, may influence the jury's intuitive estimation of risk. 9
51 It should be kept in mind that the reference situation is defined by the set of all
factors in the "same or similar circumstances" that may be relevant to bringing about the
harm. Thus, the precise definition of the reference situation may be the subject of dispute
within the litigation and may have to be resolved by the testimony of experts as to which
environmental factors are important in establishing the baseline risk. At a minimum, the
reference situation should be defined in such a way as to hold all significant relevant risk
factors constant. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41; infra text accompanying notes
82, 109. For example, there would seem to be no justification for using lung cancer statistics
for smokers to determine a baseline risk'of lung cancer for a nonsmoking plaintiff.
See supra note 44.
"This is not unlike the problem of which variables are acceptable for labor market
specification in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, -
U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2117 (1989) (addressing issue of variables or statistics relevant
as measures of "the pool of qualified job applicants" or "qualified labor force popula-
tion").
" Professor Clarence Morris discussed this same problem in the context of attorneys
trying to influence the finder of fact on the issue of foreseeability:
If official description of the facts of the case as formulated by the court is
detailed, the accident can be called unforeseeable; if it is general, the accident
can be called foreseeable. Since there is no authoritative guide to the proper
amount of specificity in describing the facts, the process of holding that a
loss is-or is not-foreseeable is fluid and often embarrasses attempts at
accurate prediction.
CLARNcE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MoRRIs, JR., MoRIs ON TORTS 165 (2d ed. 1980). The
issue of foreseeability includes as an important factor the expected frequency of occurrence,
and a factfinder's determination of this factor depends in large part on the description used
to identify the events being counted.
5 See supra note 44 (discussing jury role in intuiting baseline risk).
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A second kind of uncertainty-measurement uncertainty-arises
even in cases where appropriate variables are definable. Uncertainty
can still arise in estimates of the likelihood of occurrence because
of the potential for error in actually classifying particular instances.
The usual means of gathering mortality statistics, for example,
have well documented sources of error,60 and the data gathered
may include misclassifications of the cause of death. Scientists are
therefore concerned that data-gathering methods be both valid and
reliable: that is, that they actually measure what they are thought
to measure, and that independent reclassification of the same cases
would yield consistent results. 61 Any measurement or classification
error could, of course, result in error in estimates of baseline risk.
In a significant number of tort cases, expert witnesses testify
as to the risk factors present in the reference situation and perhaps
estimate the baseline risk itself. In the vast majority of tort cases,
however, the relevant hazard variable is taken as obvious (e.g., in
a wrongful death case, the relevant hazard is death). Moreover,
both the identification of the reference situation and the estimation
of the relative frequency of occurrence of the harm in that reference
situation are often left to the-trier of fact, without the aid of expert
testimony. For example, jurors are often left on their own to
determine the appropriate reference situation and baseline risk for
an automobile accident. 62
Despite the traditional need for expediency, however, the fact
remains that the personal experience that a judge or jury has with
the plaintiff's reference situation might be rather limited. A person
generally has information or informed intuitions on baseline risk
only for those situations that she has experienced sufficiently often.
And nonexperts may tend to be inaccurate in estimating the true
likelihood of relatively rare injurious events.63 Yet in most cases,
the court relies on the jury's judgment and imagination, based on
limited personal experience or anecdotal reports from witnesses.
As a result, legally significant determinations of baseline risk are
often based on a substantial degree of ignorance, whether due to
a lack of personal knowledge or a lack of valid and reliable data.
60 See LILmNFELD & LILIENFELD, supra note 51, at 67-71, 84-90.
" See supra note 42.
"2 See supra notes 44, 46.
6E.g., Gutro CALABREsi, TnE CosTs oF AcCIDENTs 55-57, 206-07 (1970); Paul Slovic,




Part of what is meant by saying that a situation has inherent
risk is that the circumstances and the injury are associated with
each other in some regular way in the real world. An observable,
regular association between the situation and the harm is usually
required as evidence of a risk relationship between the two, unless
the lack of observed association is explainable. 64 In order to deter-
mine baseline risk, one would look for a statistical association
between the occurrence of the reference situation absent the defen-
dant's negligence, and the occurrence of the injury. When data on
incidence are available, one. would look for a mathematical model
that could be used to predict the likelihood of injury given the
occurrence of the situation. 65
A simplified example can be constructed from the old case of
Stubbs v. City of Rochester,6 in which the plaintiff alleged that
he had contracted typhoid fever by drinking water that had become
contaminated through the negligence of the defendant. In support
of his case, the plaintiff established that he had drunk water at his
place of employment in the contaminated portion of the city and
had subsequently become ill, that the water in that portion of the
city was indeed contaminated, and that the only water he had
drunk during the relevant period was city water (both at his place
of employment and elsewhere, in uncontaminated portions of the
city). Expert witnesses for the plaintiff testified that he probably
contracted his illness from drinking the contaminated water. Sta-
tistics for a prior ten-year period confirmed that an unusually high
number of typhoid fever cases had occurred in Rochester during
the time when the water was contaminated. 67
What follows is an analysis of the baseline risk of typhoid
fever in Mr. Stubbs's case, supplying hypothetical information
where needed. Assume that Stubbs's reference situation is living in
Rochester during the relevant period and drinking only city water,
with at least some water coming from the contaminated portion of
See infra part II.D (discussing causal uncertainty).
Elsewhere, the author has discussed the notion of modeling uncertainty generally,
using the example of regression modeling. See Walker, supra note 27, at 598-608. The
common epidemiologic models discussed in this Article (relative risk and odds ratios) are
additional examples of mathematical models that are used to relate two variables: exposure
(often the independent variable) and disease incidence (the dependent variable).
124 N.E. 137 (N.Y. 1919).
67 See Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 139-40 (N.Y. 1919).
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the city. Suppose, further, that there were 15,000 full-year residents
of the City of Rochester in 1910 that drank only city water, and
that of these, 10,000 were in a situation similar to Stubbs (the
reference situation) during the relevant time period,6s in the sense
that they drank at least some water from the contaminated portion
of the city. Assume also that a total of 180 cases of typhoid fever
were reported from among those full-year residents, and that 150
of these 180 cases were among members of the set of 10,000
similarly situated residents.6 This information can be presented as
in Table 1.
Incidence of Typhoid Fever; Rochester, N.Y.;




Similar to Stubb's 150 9850
(Reference Situation)
Similar to Stubb's, 30 4970
except No Ingestion of
Contaminated Water
Table 1
The traditional tort concern is whether there is any increased
or incremental risk between being in Stubbs's situation and con-
tracting typhoid fever, after taking into account the background
incidence of typhoid fever due to living in Rochester and drinking
city water.70 The focus here, however, is on the baseline risk itself,
- The "relevant time period" would be identified by reference to the nature of
typhoid fever, its incubation period if any, and other epidemiologic features of the disease.
See Lu ENTErD & Lxu'rExmw, supra note 51, at 46-61.
The other 30 cases of typhoid fever occurred to the 5000 full-year residents that
drank water only from the uncontaminated part of the city water system.
70 In epidemiologic terms, the "incidence" rate is the number of new cases of a disease
occurring during a specified period of time, divided by the number of people exposed to
the risk of developing the disease during that time. Thus, the "incidence rate is a direct
estimate of the probability, or risk, of developing a disease during a specified period of
time." LnumEraw & LuiENFELD, supra note 51, at 138-39. The "prevalence" rate, by
contrast, measures the total number of cases present in the population at or during a




not the increased risk over baseline. To determine the incidence
that would be expected, even in the absence of the defendant's
negligence in contaminating a portion of the city's water, one could
consult rates of occurrence for the disease among those 5000 people
in 1910 that would have been, in the reference situation but for the
fact that they did not drink any of the contaminated water .7 Based
upon this background information, the expected incidence for each
cell in Table 1 would be as shown in Table 2. In comparing Table
1 and Table 2, it is clear that for people in exposure situations
similar to that of Stubbs, there is a difference between the expected
incidence of cases and the incidence that was actually observed in
1910.
Expected Incidence of Typhoid Fever; Rochester, N.Y.;




Similar to Stubb's 60 9940
(Reference Situation)
Similar to Stubb's, 30 4970
except No Ingestion of
Contaminated Water
Table 2
Table 3 presents the general format for a 2 X 2 table useful in
evaluating the plaintiff's baseline risk when the defendant's negli-
71 In addition, or alternatively, one could consider the incidence in other years during
which there was no contamination, provided other factors affecting typhoid incidence were
substantially similar to the reference situation. Assume for simplicity that for the prior ten
years, the incidence of typhoid fever during the same four months of the year as the
outbreak in 1910 averaged sixty cases per 10,000 people-the same rate as for the 5000
residents in 1910 that did not drink contaminated water.
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gent act is conceptualized as a separate risk factor. 72 In Table 3,
the values a, b, c, and d are the frequencies of cases in each cell
of the 2 X 2 table. In generating this information, each instance
or subject must be classified into the appropriate categories of the
exposure variable7 3 and the injury variable.





Reference Situation a b a + b
Reference Situation, c d c + d
except without
Defendant's Act
Totals: a+c b+d a+b+c+d
Table 3
Once the data have been assembled in this format, any statis-
tical association between the variables can be examined. Two prin-
cipal questions are whether an association exists at all, and, if so,
7 Sociologists and epidemiologists, although pursuing similar lines of analytical rea-
soning and performing comparable statistical analyses, often utilize different conventions.
In constructing a 2 X 2 table, for example, sociologists often set up the table so that the
dependent variable's categories are listed down the left side ("stub") of the table, while the
categories of the independent variable are listed across the top ("heading") of the table.
See, e.g., LoETHER & McTAvisH, supra note 42, at 180. Epidemiologists, on the other hand,
usually list the exposure variable (the independent variable in a prospective study) down the
left side of the table and the disease variable across the top of the table. See, e.g., Sa
SELviN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF EPDmMoiLoGIc DATA 345 (1991); HAROLD A. KA &
CHRISTOPHER T. SEMPOS, STATISTICAL MErHODS N EPIDEMIOLOGY 45-50 (1989); LimINLD
& LnamN'EL, supra note 51, at 196 (Tables 8-2 and 8-3). The convention adopted here
follows the approach of the epidemiologists, conceptualizing the baseline risk and the
incremental risk created by the defendant as resulting from exposure factors and listing the
exposure situations down the left side of the table.
73 The independent variable may also be a characteristic, such as being in a specific
blood group or having a certain gene. For simplicity, however, this analysis will refer simply
to "exposure" to the relevant risk factors.
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what the strength of the association is74 No association exists if
there is no difference in the percentage distribution of cases under
the injury variable for the categories in the exposure variable. In
other words, there is complete statistical independence of the injury
variable relative to the exposure variable if identical percentages
appear in each cell in each column. For the format in Table 3, no
association of injury categories to exposure categories would exist
if percentages are computed for the rows corresponding to each of
the exposure categories (e.g., percentages are computed such that
the percentages for the ratios (a/a+b) and (b/a+b) add to 100%),
and the percentages in each column are identical (e.g., the per-
centage for the ratio a/a + b equals the percentage for c/c + d).
An illustration of statistical independence can be constructed
by converting the expected frequencies in Table 2 into percentages
as shown in Table 4. If these expected frequencies had actually
occurred, there would be no evidence of statistical association
between drinking that contaminated water and developing typhoid
fever. By contrast, the (hypothetical) observed results presented in
Table 1 do evidence a statistical association when presented in
percentages, as in Table 5.
Expected Incidence of Typhoid Fever, in Percentages;




Similar to Stubbs's 0.6% 99.4% 100%
(Reference Situation)
Similar to Stubbs's, 0.6% 99.4% 100%
Except No Ingestion of
Contaminated Water
Table 4
1' Two additional characteristics of an association become important when the varia-
bles are quantitative in nature: the direction of the association and the nature of the
association. The direction of any association is determined by whether the higher values of
one variable are associated with the higher values of the other variable (a positive associa-
tion), or whether the higher values of one variable are associated with the lower values of
the other variable (a negative association). The nature of an association may be linear or
curvilinear. See LOETHMR & McTAvisH, supra note 42, at 193-96.
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Observed Incidence of Typhoid Fever, in Percentages;




Similar to Stubbs's 1.5% 98.5% 100%
(Reference Situation)
Similar to Stubbs's, 0.6% 99.4% 100%
except No Ingestion of
Contaminated Water
Table 5
It has become common for epidemiologists to use incidence
data, such as the hypothetical data in Table 5, to identify "risk
factors": those exposure factors or characteristics that are associ-
ated with increased risk.75 Once a risk factor has been identified,
the strength of the statistical association between the risk factor
and disease incidence can be expressed by either "relative risk" or
"odds ratios." ' 76 Relative risk is the ratio of the incidence rate of
typhoid fever for those with the risk factor (exposure to water
negligently contaminated by the defendant) relative to the incidence
rate for those similarly situated except for the risk factor. 77 The
71 See LILIENFELD & LILIENFELD, supra note 51, at 259-60.
76 See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEViN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERs 1-2,
18 (1990); KAHN & SEmsoS, supra note 72, at 45; LILIEN ELD & LILIENFELD, supra note 51,
at 209, 342-47; Leon Gordis, Estimating Risk and Inferring Causality in Epidemiology, in
EPIDEMaoLoGY AND HEALTH Risx ASSESSMENT 51-52 (Leon Gordis ed., 1988).
This is not to suggest that other statistical measures, such as Guttman's Coefficient
of Predictability or Goodman and Kruskal's tau-y, would not provide useful measures of,
or perspectives on, strength of association between qualitative variables. See, e.g., LOETHER
& McTAVISH, supra note 42, at 225-27. The conceptual objectives of this Article, however,
would not be advanced by including a discussion of such alternative approaches.




KAHN & SEMPOS, supra note 72, at 45-46. After percentages are calculated so that rows in
Table 3 sum to 100% (as in Table 4), relative risk is the ratio of percentages in each
column: 0.6 / 0.6 = 1.0 (showing no statistical association) for those expected to get
typhoid fever in Table 4, and 1.5 / 0.6 = 2.5 for those with typhoid fever in Table 5.
[VoL. 80
BASELINE RISK
relative risk of those in Stubbs's reference situation, compared to
those in Rochester similarly situated with the sole exception of not
drinking the contaminated water, is 2.5. 71 In other words, these
data indicate that those persons in Stubbs's situation had a risk of
typhoid fever that was 2.5 times the risk faced by those not exposed
to the contaminated water.79
An alternative measure of strength of association is the odds
ratio: a comparison of the odds of contracting typhoid fever if
subjected to the defendant's negligence (the reference situation) to
the odds of contracting the disease if not so subjected.80 The odds
ratio of the observed data from Table I is 2.523.81 The odds of
contracting typhoid fever were 2.523 times greater for those in
Stubbs's situation than for those that did not drink the contami-
nated water.
The conceptual approach of this Article may be characterized
as one using an epidemiologic paradigm to think of the defendant's
negligent act as a risk factor with respect to the relevant type of
injury, and the combination of all risk factors other than the
defendant's negligent act as comprising the baseline risk. Using
this terminology, the plaintiff's capability of establishing liability
depends in part on whether she can establish that the defendant's
act was a risk factor in the situation, incremental to the other risk
factors inherent in the reference situation. 2
78 The computation is: (150/10,000) / (30/5000) = 0.015 / 0.006 = 2.5. See supra
note 77.
" Note here the critical importance of defining the reference situation as including
only those persons that were similarly situated to Stubbs. It would be irrelevant-and would
bias the baseline risk estimate in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant-to include
incidence data not otherwise representative of Rochester: for example, incidence data from
the nation as a whole, from some foreign city, or from some other time when typhoid risk
conditions in Rochester were significantly different.
10 In terms of the general format used in Table 3, the odds ratio is defined as (a/b)/
(c/d). With algebraic manipulation, it can be shown that this formula has a simpler form,
a ratio of cross-products from the 2 X 2 table: ad / bc. See, e.g., FIqaLsTEmN & LEviN,
supra note 76, at 2-4; KAHN & SnMpos, supra note 72, at 52; Gordis, supra note 76, at 52.
11 The calculation is as follows: (150/9850) / (30/4970) = 2.523. The calculation
using the simpler form, see supra note 80, yields identical results: (150)(4970)/(30)(9850) =
2.523.
This example illustrates a general principle: if the incidence rate of injury is relatively
small, then the odds ratio will closely approximate the relative risk. See FInxatTEN &
LEvIN, supra note 76, at 2-3; KAhN & SEMos, supra note 72, at 47-51; LMuONTmL &
LmrENFELD, supra note 51, at 209-10.
82 Methods for determining the magnitude of baseline risk are closely allied to methods
that could be used to determine whether a defendant's negligent act created any incremental




Information about the normal incidence of harm in identifiable
situations, the fundamental data for determining baseline risk, is
always limited. It is limited to information about those situations
and outcomes personally familiar to the judge or jury, or to
information reported to them through the testimony of experts.
Expert testimony is based in turn either on the expert's own ex-
perience with some number of such situations or, more often, on
reports of other experts documenting statistics for such situations.
Even in cases where statistics about baseline risk are available, such
statistics are invariably based upon a limited number of instances.
In all cases, therefore, the basis for the finder of fact's conclusions
about baseline risk is a sample: a limited number of instances of
the reference situation and hazard event relevant to the litigation.
The task is to devise techniques for estimating baseline risk on
the basis of such limited information and for assessing the extent
to which the limited data that happen to be available are really
representative of the reference situation. Enabling such estimates
and assessments is one of the objectives of the statistical theory of
sampling. This theory is most straightforward for sampling per-
formed in a random manner (e.g., "simple random sampling,"
which is performed in such a way that each possible sample of the
size drawn has an equal chance of being drawn 83). When the
available sample is a random sample, then one can employ statis-
tical sampling theory to estimate incidence rates and baseline risk
with considerable confidence.
The reasoning behind such an estimate is hypothetical in form.
If an hypothesis is made that the baseline risk for typhoid fever
for Rochester residents in 1910 was 0.6°1o, as in Table 4, and a
randomly selected sample of full-year residents that did not drink
the contaminated water showed a much higher or lower percentage
of fever cases, it would suggest that the original hypothesis was
false. A sampling result is said to be "statistically significant" with
respect to some hypothesized value for the population, if it would
be very unlikely that such a sampling result would have been drawn
if the hypothesis value were true. If the sampling results are "sta-
risk, it is not surprising that similar evidentiary techniques could be used to establish both.
The discussion in this Article, although focusing on techniques for determining the magni-
tude of baseline risk, also lays a conceptual foundation for undertaking an analysis of
unreasonable risk.
13 See generally Walker, supra note 27, at 588-98.
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tistically significant," then one can conclude with considerable
confidence that the hypothesis of 0.6%V0 for the reference situation
was probably wrong and can "reject" that hypothesis as unlikely
to be true.
One technique for conveying information about the statistical
significance of a sample is the "confidence interval." A confidence
interval is a range of possible true values in the population. For
example, the percentage of typhoid fever cases among full-year
Rochester residents that did not drink contaminated water might
be characterized as "between 0.307% and 0.9070," or "0.3% - 0.9%."
If this range is a confidence interval, then all values within the
confidence interval cannot be rejected on the basis of the sample
(that is, the sample is not statistically significant for hypothesis
values within the confidence interval), but all values outside the
interval may be rejected (the sample results are statistically signif-
icant for those hypothesis values)., 5 A "95% confidence interval"
is a range of hypothesis values that should not be rejected on the
basis of the sample results, provided one is prepared to be wrong
in as many as 5% of the cases (i.e., one is willing to accept that
perhaps 1 time in 20 the confidence interval would not contain the
true value).86 Confidence intervals provide a convenient way for
reporting which hypothesis values are rejectable, and which are
not, given a sample.8 7
When data are gathered on a specific group of people, one is
usually dealing with a sample drawn from the population. If, for
example, one treats the 5000 residents of Rochester as a simple
random sample of persons similarly situated to Stubbs except for
the absence of drinking the contaminated water, then based upon
the observed percentage of 0.6% in that sample,8 one can derive
" For a discussion of the scientific convention adopting "less than 0.05" as the
sampling probability that is so low that it is used to define "statistical significance," see
Walker, supra note 27, at 593-98. Cf. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d
823, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming lower court's grant of judgment n.o.v. in defendant's
favor in Bendectin case because expert's opinion lacked an adequate basis; expert "acknowl-
edged the necessity of a statistically significant association between the drug and its effect
in human populations," but no published studies had concluded that there was such an
association).
" JACOB COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPLIED MuLTn'x REOIEssIoN/CORRELAnON
ANALYsIS FOR ThE BEHAvioRAL SCIENCES 63 (2d ed. 1983); WuIAM L. HAYs, STATISTICS
206-09, 235-41, 277-78 (4th ed. 1988).
" COHEN & COHEN, supra note 85, at 63; HAYs, supra note 85, at 206, 236, 278.
" COHEN & COHEN, supra note 85, at 63; HAYs, supra note 85, at 278.
U See supra Table 5.
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a 95% confidence interval of plus or minus approximately 0.2%
around that observed percentage. 9 Even if the true incidence in
the population were 0.6%, one could still expect to draw, perhaps
nineteen times out of twenty, a random sample of 5000 people
with as few typhoid cases as twenty (5000 x 0.4%) or as many
cases as forty (5000 x 0.8%). If this sample of 5000 is used to
derive an estimate of baseline risk for Stubbs's reference situation,
and one concludes that that true baseline risk is probably within
the confidence interval of 0.4% - 0.8%, then one can calculate
that in a group of 10,000 (the number of people in Stubbs's
reference situation) as many as forty to eighty cases are very likely
due to baseline risk.
Part II.B. of this Article introduced relative risk and the odds
ratio as measures of the strength of the statistical association.
Confidence intervals can also be computed for these measures,
providing a measure of the sampling uncertainty inherent in these
risk or odds statistics. Using accepted methods for computing
confidence intervals of relative risks, 9° the 95% confidence limits
around the relative risk of 2.5 found in Table 1 would be approx-
imately 1.69 and 3.69.91 The relative risk of 2.5 is therefore signif-
icantly different (in a statistical sense) from 1.0 (zero increase in
relative risk). One can reject with considerable confidence the
hypothesis that those in Stubbs's reference situation were no more
11 From a population with a proportion (incidence rate of disease) of 0.006 ("P"),
the expected value of the proportion ("p") in the sample (of size n = 5000) is also 0.006,
with a standard error (unit dispersion) equal to




See HAys, supra note 85, at 240; LIUENFELD & LILIENFELD, supra note 51, at 332-36. With
n = 5000, and the proportion in the population P = 0.006 (0.6%), the normal distribution
provides a reasonable form for the sampling distribution of the proportion. See HAYS, supra
note 85, at 240; LiUENFELD & LnmiNrELD, supra note 51, at 333. The 95% confidence
interval around 0.006 is therefore provided by plus or minus 1.96 x 0.001 = 0.002
(approximately). See id. at 333-36; HAYs, supra note 85, at 240-41. This estimate for the
95% confidence interval, while adequate for this discussion, is inappropriately symmetrical.
For an incidence rate this small (0.006), a confidence interval based on the Poisson distri-
bution would be approximately 0.4%-0.86%. See LsUaNmLD & Lum. EID, supra note 51,
at 336-38.
10 See LmLIENFELD & L1UrFELD, supra note 51, at 344-46; D. Katz et al., Obtaining
Confidence Intervals for the Risk Ratio in Cohort Studies, in 34 BioMETIUcs 469 (1978);
KAHN & SEm'os, supra note 72, at 62-63.
"1 The calculation, which utilizes the natural logarithm transform of the relative risk
and an estimate of the variance for this transform, is as follows. The relative risk (RR) is
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at risk for typhoid fever than those residents of Rochester at the
time that did not drink the contaminated water. 92
If quantitative data on baseline risk are available,93 such that
confidence intervals can be derived for relative risk or the odds
2.5, and the natural logarithm of 2.5 On 2.5) is 0.916. One estimate of the variance of In
RR, using the notation of Table 3, is given by the formula:
1 1 ' 1+ + +
(a + ' (b+'/) (c +'/) (d +'/)
The calculation of the estimated variance for the data in Table I is:
1 1 1 1
est. var. - + + - +150.5 +9850.5 30.5 4970.5
= 0.0066 + 0.0001 + 0.0328 + 0.0002,
= 0.0397.
The estimated standard error of In RR is the square root of the variance:
est. S.E. On RR) = J.37 = 0.199.
The 95% confidence interval (CIgs) in natural logarithms is provided by:
CI, (In RR) = On RR) ± (1.96 x S.E. (In RR)),
= 0.916 ± (1.96 x 0.199),
= 0.916 ± 0.39.
The confidence limits in logarithms are thus 0.526 and 1.306. Finally, transforming these
two limits back from natural logarithms provides the approximate 95% confidence interval
in units of relative risk:
CI,,, RR = 1.69 to 3.69.
See LmmNFD & LumNaDI, supra note 51, at 344. Using Woolf's method for
calculating confidence intervals for the odds ratio, see KAHN & Smpos, supra note 72, at
56; SELViN, supra note 72, at 344-47, the 950 confidence limits for the odds ratio of 2.523
for the data in Table 1 are approximately 1.7 and 3.74. Woolf's method utilizes the natural
logarithm transform of the estimated odds ratio, together with a formula for the estimated
standard error of this transform, as follows:
OR = 2.523,
In OR = 0.9254.
est. S.E. an OR) = 1+ + 1 +
a b c d'
--
= 0.2007.
CI,, (n OR) = 0.9254 ± (1.96 x 0.2007),
= 0.9254 ± 0.393.
The 95% confidence limits for the odds ratio (transformed back from the natural logarithms)
are therefore approximately 1.7 and 3.74. These confidence limits closely approximate those
for the relative risk and also show statistical significance relative to the hypothesis that there
was no incremental risk for being in Stubbs's situation.
91 A desirable characteristic for an adequate concept of baseline risk is that no
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ratio, two questions arise: How much sampling uncertainty should
be tolerated in tort litigation? And what is the minimal degree of
confidence on which a jury should be able to rely? Simply because
a scientific convention exists to accept 95% confidence as the
"bright line" of statistical significance does not mean that tort
litigation should automatically require equal confidence in associ-
ations before a jury is entitled to find a value for baseline risk.94
This is too broad a problem, however, to try to resolve at this
point. The objective here is simply to understand the kinds of
uncertainty inherent in any determination of baseline risk, and thus
reach a better appreciation of the nature of the concept.
D. Causal Uncertainty
The causal complexity inherent in the kind of situation increas-
ingly dealt with in torts introduces a potential for causal error, in
addition to conceptual, measurement, modeling, and sampling er-
ror.95 Tort claims may involve situations in which the baseline risks
result from combinations of environmental toxins, pharmaceutical
products, genetic or other health characteristics, or complications
with particular medical operations. Such reference situations may
present complicated causal systems and result in tremendous un-
certainty as to causal interactions. Causal uncertainty may arise
because causal factors are numerous, not readily observable by the
casual observer, or interactive in their effects.96 The casual observer
conceptual change is needed to accommodate the transition of legal decision making from
a qualitative mode to a quantitative mode. As more statistical information about accident
situations becomes available, the law should not have to undergo a redefinition of concepts
in order to accommodate it. The concept of baseline risk proposed here is designed to fit
into such a comprehensive framework by providing a single conceptual bridge between more
traditional cases (e.g., qualitatively evaluated automobile collision cases) and cases where
quantitative scientific information on risk is available.
- Although this question arises naturally in the context of calculating confidence
intervals, it is really one aspect of the broader issue of how much scientific uncertainty
should be acceptable in tort litigation (i.e., how much conceptual and measurement uncer-
tainty, modeling, sampling, and causal uncertainty).
9s See generally Walker, supra note 27, at 608-18.
96 In the automobile collision case where the defendant negligently loses control of
his car, crosses the center line, and collides with the plaintiff's car, the causal effect of the
defendant's act so dominates the normal risks inherent in the situation that one has little
difficulty deciding that the baseline risk is very low, and that the defendant's act "caused"
the injury. On the other hand, in the case of a medical misdiagnosis or an increased
exposure to a carcinogen, the determination of the baseline risk may become significantly




may notice that event A occurred, followed by event B. A more
careful observer may note only that event B sometimes follows
event A in a given situation, and sometimes not. The observable
regularity expected from a simple causal relationship might not
ever appear. 97
This subpart discusses several problems associated with deter-
mining causal relationships within causally complex situations. First,
in order to refine the understanding of causal uncertainty and the
implications for baseline risk, it discusses several experimental de-
sign principles and statistical techniques that assist in deriving
causal conclusions from statistical associations. Then the subpart
analyzes a fundamental epistemological and proof problem referred
to as the "baseline risk paradox."
1. The Nature of Causal Uncertainty
Some concept of causation is implicit in the concept of risk:
risk involves the chance that harm will result from a situation,
with the presupposition that some underlying causal connections
are bringing about the harm, even if all of the causal elements are
not identifiable or their interactive effects are not traceable in
detail.9" Although the mechanics of cancer may not be understood,
it is assumed that the reason cancer poses a risk of death is that a
causal process is underway in the body that often brings about
death in the normal course of things. Cancer poses a risk of death
because some process manifesting as "cancer" causes death.
To the extent that baseline risk exists in a reference situation,
therefore, one assumes that there must be a causal relationship
between some causal factors (other than the defendant's negligence)
in the type of situation presented and the type of injury suffered
by the plaintiff.99 Baseline risk presupposes a causal nexus between
'7Uncertainty as to the underlying and unobserved causal system can remain even if
the sample size (number of observed situations) is increased dramatically. The lack of
observed correlation may not be an artifact of sampling error at all. The statistical treatments
of sampling error discussed in the previous section do not address the problem of causal
error.
In tort litigation, the current theories of liability are predominantly causal: there is
no liability on the part of the defendant unless the defendant's acts are causally related to
the plaintiff's injuries.
"A good example of a combination of baseline risk and defendant-created risk is
smoking cigarettes and exposure to asbestos as combined risk factors for illness. See, e.g.,
Irving V. Selikoff & E. Coyler Hammand, Asbestos and Smoking, 242 JAMA 458 (1979).
The relative contributions of smoking and asbestos exposure to illness have had increasing
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factors at work in the situation presented and the plaintiff's type
of injury. In part, therefore, the evidence for baseline risk often
includes evidence of this causal nexus, evidence of these causal
factors.
Although for convenience the causal relationship can be de-
scribed as running from the "situation" to the injury, the term
"situation" is intended to refer to that set of factors or agents
that were present in the plaintiff's circumstances and which could
cause (together or in isolation) the type of injury in question. For
example, in the Stubbs case, the baseline risk of typhoid fever was
thought to be the result of a large number of possible causal paths,
including the consumption of raw fruits and vegetables, shell fish,
and milk, or infection through house flies or other persons already
infected. 10° Scientists have developed various techniques for study-
ing such complex systems of causal factors.
Statistically significant associations can be created between two
variables either because they are causally related directly to each
other (one causing the other), or because some other factor has a
causal influence on both variables. 101 A symptom might be caused
by the prescription drug that has been ingested, or by the under-
lying disease for which the drug has been prescribed, or by some
condition totally unrelated to that drug or that disease. It is only
in well-designed clinical studies, where a sufficiently large number
of subjects are randomly assigned to the treatment and control
groups, and the subsequent histories of the subjects are adequately
studied, that the scientific ideal of a study design for isolating
specific causal actions is approached.102 Daily life makes people
importance in the massive asbestos litigation. See, e.g., Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418
N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1988) (lung cancer); Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528
A.2d 947 (Pa. 1987) (asbestosis).
,00 See Stubbs, 124 N.E. at 138.
A parallel can be made to gambling. In a given throw of a pair of dice, the risk of
losing can be calculated as a single value, using combinatorial methods from probability
theory, although there are numerous actual events (pairs of outcomes) that together account
for the total risk. Several aspects of the gambling example make it relatively simplistic,
however. Only one of those events (throws) will actually bring about the loss in the particular
case, whereas in tort cases an infection, might actually be caused by multiple agents.
Moreover, in the case of gambling, the process of deriving a combined risk is usually helped
by the fact that each die throw is independent of any other.
101 Walker, supra note 27, at 613.
102 Retrospective or cross-sectional studies use design methods and statistical control
techniques to approximate this ideal study design, but such approaches have corresponding




unfortunately familiar with the hunt for the elusive cause of a
recurring bodily ailment (a hunt often complicated by the causal
influence of psychological factors) and aware of the dangers of
assuming that post hoc ergo propter hoc.
The rebuttal argument of defendants when significant baseline
risk exists is often of the form that a temporal, or even statistical,
relationship between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's injury
is coincidental, and that the real cause is something else in the
situation. In other words, once the plaintiff has produced sufficient
evidence of negligence and proximate cause to get her case to the
jury, the defendant has an interest in establishing the existence of
a significant baseline risk (relative to the incremental risk allegedly
created by the defendant), and the plaintiff has an interest in
minimizing the magnitude of baseline risk. One task of the trier
of fact is to decide the issue of causation as between the defendant-
created unreasonable risk and the baseline risk. 10 3 This task presents
the problem of the "baseline risk paradox."
2. The "Baseline Risk Paradox"
In Stubbs,04 the plaintiff presented evidence to show that he
had drunk water from a contaminated portion of the city water
system, that he had subsequently contracted typhoid fever, and
that fifty-eight others had drunk water from the same vicinity and
had become ill with the same disease. Although Stubbs had also
drunk water from uncontaminated portions of the city, the only
water he had drunk during the relevant period was city water. His
testimony was supported by expert opinion that he had been made
ill by drinking the contaminated water. Despite such evidence, the
trial court granted a motion for nonsuit at the close of the plain-
tiff's case; the appellate division affirmed by a three-two vote; and
the court of appeals reversed in a narrow four-three vote. The
defendant had argued that the plaintiff had failed to establish
"that his illness was not due to any other cause to which typhoid
fever may be attributed for which defendant is not liable."' 0 5 The
o, The formulation of the standard of proof as "more likely than not" leads to a
companion formulation: the task of the jury on the issue of cause in fact is to decide
whether the evidence tips in the direction of the defendant's negligence or in the direction
of the set of all other factors present in the reference situation. The jury is to decide
between the defendant's negligent act and "everything else" that might have caused the
injury.
,04 124 N.E. 137; see also supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
"I Stubbs, 124 N.E. at 138.
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defendant had offered evidence that there were many ways of
contracting typhoid fever.
Perhaps what troubled the numerous judges hearing this case
at various stages was what this Article will call the "baseline risk
paradox." Simply stated, the existence of a residual non-negligible
baseline risk for the injury suffered by the plaintiff requires that
the causal determination in the case be made without the aid of
any deciding qualitative factors. Conceptually, this paradox is the
root of both the "indeterminate plaintiff" problem"'6 and the "lost
chance" problem. 0 7 The practical question for the court is what
burden of production of evidence to place on the plaintiff, before
allowing the jury to guess about the actual causation in the partic-
ular case at bar and entering judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff.
In Stubbs's lawsuit, as the plaintiff added public health statis-
tics to the medical expert testimony and the anecdotal lay testi-
- The "indeterminate plaintiff" problem arises when the defendant's negligence in-
jures some number of individuals, but those specific individuals cannot be identified within
a larger set of persons with the same injury. See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relax-
ation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REv. 881, 882-86
,(1982). The question of how to resolve liability in such suits has received considerable
attention. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 833-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988);
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRiAL: MASS Toxic DisAsTERS IN Tm COURTS 181-
91, 255-76 (1987); Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 52 FoRDHAm L. Rviaw 732, 767-69, 782-84 (1984); Delgado, supra; Michael
Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-
Fact, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. Rav. 429 (1983); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens
of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986);
Kristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr.
Dore, 7 HARv. ENVLY. L. Rav. 441 (1983); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. Rav. 849
(1984); Paul Sherman, Agent Orange and the Problem of the Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52
BROOK. L. REv. 369 (1986); Mary Carter Andrews, Note, Proof of Cancer Causation in
Toxic Waste Litigation: The Case of Determinacy Versus Indeterminacy, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 2075, 2077, 2098, 2104-10 (1988) (restricting discussion of "indeterminate plaintiffs"
to those having no diagnosable signs of disease at the time of suit).
This Article is not intended to resolve the debate, which involves the appropriate
judicial use of causation rules and issues of equity and fairness. This Article is limited,
rather, to the perspective of baseline risk. It is worth noting, however, that the conceptual
roots of the indeterminate plaintiff problem lie in the baseline risk paradox, and that the
problem is not limited to a few peculiar types of cases characterized by certain kinds of
causation proof. It is an instance of a more generic problem that occurs whenever there
remains residual baseline risk after whatever evidence that is available has been taken into
account.
-o The "lost chance" problem is whether or when to allow a plaintiff to get to a jury
if the baseline risk (e.g., of dying from a disease even if it had not been negligently
diagnosed or treated) is greater than 50 percent. See supra note 13.
[VOL. 80
BASELINE RISK
mony, he in fact established that of the hundreds of cases of
typhoid fever in Rochester over the years, a large number had
occurred in the absence of the negligent water contamination at
issue in his case. There was at that time a significant baseline risk
of typhoid fever from living in Rochester, quite apart from the
water contamination incident of 1910. What is most reasonable to
conclude, on the basis of all the evidence, is that of the 150 cases
of typhoid fever that appeared during the relevant months of 1910,
some substantial but indefinite number of cases were due to causes
other than the contaminated water.
Assuming that among those 150 cases with exposures similar
to Stubbs's, the contaminated water caused a statistically significant
increase in the number of typhoid fever cases, yet some baseline
number of cases occurred that were not caused by the contaminated
water, the problem is determining into which category Mr. Stubbs
fell. It can be presumed that there was no additional, unreported
evidence that placed Mr. Stubbs in the defendant-caused category
and not in the baseline category, for if there had been such evidence
it surely would have been reported in the court's opinion. But more
important is the point that, even if there had been such evidence,
it would not obviate the problem unless the additional information
succeeded in placing Mr. Stubbs in a subgroup of cases having no
residual baseline risk (that is, all such cases were caused by the
defendant's negligent act). As long as baseline risk remains, the
problem remains: How is one to decide, nonarbitrarily, whether
the particular plaintiff's case is a defendant-caused case or a base-
line case?
This is not a problem peculiar to Stubbs's case, nor one peculiar
to infectious diseases. In most cases of illness or injury with mul-
tiple possible causes, at some point the etiology of the particular
case is not identifiable in any determinate way. At some level of
medical analysis, the number of distinguishing characteristics pres-
ent in the particular case is exhausted, and if some baseline risk
still remains, the decision whether to place the particular case into
the defendant-caused category or the baseline risk category would
appear to be fundamentally arbitrary. The paradox is that, no
matter how many distinguishing characteristics are taken into ac-
count, if baseline risk remains after the new characteristic is fac-
tored into the analysis, then the arbitrariness is not eliminated.
It might be objected that categorizing a specific case as either
defendant-caused or baseline on the basis of probabilities is not
"arbitrary." If one says that the baseline subcategory out of the
1991-92]
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150 Stubbs-similar cases probably consists of about sixty cases,10
leaving about ninety cases probably caused by the defendant, then
placing Stubbs in the ninety-member group cannot be called "ar-
bitrary." Several considerations, however, render such an objection
problematic. First, by hypothesis, the 150 cases are alike in all
relevant risk factors, so far as can be determined, and no winnow-
ing or distinguishing characteristics exists. 109 Thus, if one were to
try to decide which ninety out of the 150 cases were the defendant-
caused cases, there would be no distinguishing characteristics to
provide a decisional basis.
Second, if one believes that causal sequences are real and
definite, then Stubbs's illness either was caused by bacillus ingested
with defendant's water or it was not.Y0 Any probability statements
would seem to be about human knowledge (or ignorance) about
the actual causal sequence in Stubbs's case, or about some idealized
thought experiment, but not about the specific causal sequence
itself."' Which individual case is in which category is not known,
11 This illustration uses the expected number of 60 as the estimate of baseline risk, in
order to make what appears to be a stronger argument for the plaintiff. In practice one
should take into account sampling uncertainty, derive a 95% confidence interval of ± 20,
and conclude with conventional confidence that it is very unlikely that less than 40 or more
than 80 cases are due to baseline risk. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
,09 By definition, the baseline risk takes into account only risk factors relevant to the
plaintiff's situation and case, see supra text accompanying notes 38-41; notes 55, 82.
Moreover, the paradox only arises when there is residual baseline risk (i.e., risk remaining
once all available distinguishing characteristics have been taken into account).
110 In Stubbs's case, his illness may also have resulted from the combination of bacilli
taken in from multiple sources, including the defendant's contaminated water. The possi-
bility of such cumulative effects does not remove the paradox and is a further complication
that need not divert this discussion.
"I This is very much unlike those situations postulated in probability theory that
assume equiprobable, elementary events (such as the toss of a fair coin, the roll of a fair
die, or the deal of a fair and randomly distributed deck of cards). In those situations, the
probability model is valid because the causal mechanism producing the elementary events is
adequately understood-as when the coin or die is determined or assumed to be "fair."
But in the Stubbs case, the uncertainty is about the causal system at work.
Consider the following analogy. Two persons make a sizable wager and flip a coin,
which lands "heads." Was the result due to pure chance or due to one party's manipulation
of a biased coin? The answer depends, of course, on what causal system was at work
producing the result. Rehearsing probability theorems about projected outcomes is in itself
irrelevant. Those models do not apply unless the coin was in fact a fair coin. Those
theorems might suggest a testing protocol to determine whether the coin and its manner of
being tossed produce unbiased results in the long run. But it should be clear that probability
theory alone will not retrospectively solve the problem posed.
Similarly, the relative percentages of cases falling in each category should be irrelevant
to determining whether Stubbs himself fell into one category or the other. Those percentages
would be relevant only if Stubbs were drawn randomly from the 150 cases, and the issue
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although very good reason exists to conclude that if one could find
out, one would probably find about ninety of the cases in the
defendant-caused category.
Finally, if damages were to be awarded in all 150 cases, thereby
treating similar cases similarly, about sixty of those decisions would
probably be wrong-but no one knows which sixty. Although
6/15 (60/150) may be the rate of error in the long run if all the
similar cases were classified as defendant-caused cases, still it is
difficult to jump from that insight to a conclusion of correctness
about any single, individual case.Y2 Of course, there may be policy
reasons to favor systematically erring on the side of the plaintiff.
Such might be the case when the defendant was negligent and the
plaintiff was blameless, the defendant has a greater capacity than
the plaintiff to spread the costs of the accident, and so forth. But
this should not obscure the paradox that, in any particular case,
despite any amount of scientific information directly on point, the
existence of residual baseline risk renders any categorical decision
on causation epistemologically arbitrary.Y3
The courts have tended to obscure this paradox in several ways.
First, when expert testimony is required, the courts impose on the
expert witness the expectation of making the arbitrary decision and
place the burden of producing such a witness on the plaintiff. If
were the probability associated with that draw. It is the random draw that is the "causal
mechanism" that makes the percentages relevant by conferring upon Stubbs (and each other
case) an equal probability of being drawn. But the issue in the litigation is not what Stubbs's
probability would be if he were drawn at random from a group of 150 cases. The question
is which causal mechanism actually made Stubbs ill: a baseline mechanism or the defendant's
negligence. Deciding the latter issue on the basis of the relative percentages is as unreasonable
and irrelevant as deciding that a losing hand of poker must have been the result of a fair
deal because the odds are in favor of being dealt such a hand if the deal had been fair.
Without an inspection of the deck, the card preparation, and the dealing process, one
cannot decide whether the dealer or "fate" caused a particular loss. Cf. Gold, supra note
106, at 390 n.72 (explaining that causation in specific case, although unknowable, is in fact
"true-or false"; either the individual's disease is a background case or it was actually caused
by exposure to a toxic material); Rosenberg, supra note 106, at 869-70 (stating that the
judicial desire for "particularistic" evidence of causation in mass exposure cases is ultimately
misguided because no such evidence can be produced).
222 See supra note I11.
M Indeed, one could argue (although this Article will not pursue the argument) that
the acceptance of the baseline risk paradox should free tort law from the pretense of needing
to require cause-in-fact as a necessary element of liability and should allow the courts to
press forward with fashioning a law that is fair and efficient. Cf. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073-78 (N.Y.) (disallowing defendants in DES case from exculpating
themselves on the basis of no cause in fact of particular plaintiff's injury, once product
defectiveness, generic causation, and national market share are demonstrated), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989).
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the plaintiff fails to produce an expert witness that will testify that,
in her expert opinion, the plaintiff's case probably is in the defen-
dant-caused category, then the court will probably rule that the
jury is being asked to "speculate" impermissibly, with the result
that the plaintiff will lose as a matter of law.1 14 If the plaintiff is
successful in obtaining such expert testimony, then the jury gets to
hear the case, and the substantive rationale for the ultimate decision
is shrouded behind the jury verdict. Although experts can reduce
or eliminate baseline risk by taking into account causal factors
present in or absent from the plaintiff's reference situation, they
also are often faced with the need to reach an arbitrary decision
in the face of residual baseline risk. Experts cannot make knowl-
edge out of nothing, even though, like people in general, they are
not always adverse to making opinions out of nothing.
Second, courts have obscured the significance of the baseline
risk paradox by characterizing the difference between having and
not having such expert testimony as the difference between not
speculating and speculating. It would be much less misleading to
describe the difference as a matter of who is speculating and the
level of speculation. When no expert testimony is available, the
jury is forced to engage in the speculation alone, and the specu-
lation is on the level of the uninformed nonexpert. Little or no
guidance is available to the jury concerning what factors are pos-
sible causes and concerning the estimated number of cases falling
into the baseline category. When expert testimony is available, on
the other hand, the jury may receive guidance about the state of
the art in the relevant scientific area, about which factors are
thought to be causally relevant and which are not, and about the
baseline incidence of the relevant injury in similar situations.
There are undoubtedly good policy reasons for placing a burden
of production of expert testimony on the plaintiff, in the interest
of forcing at least one party to place such information before the
jury. But the rationale should not be that such experts can routinely
get "to the bottom of things." Rather, whenever residual baseline
risk exists, the expert cannot determine whether the particular case
at bar falls into the baseline category or not.1 5 The requirement
114 E.g., Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980); see Hanselmann v.
McCardle, 267 S.E.2d 531 (S.C. 1980).
"I Some courts have been refreshingly candid about the judicial recognition that
scientific experts speculate, even when the court may be perplexed about viable alternatives.
In Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474, the plaintiff was unable to oppose a motion for summary
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that the plaintiff produce expert testimony as part of her prima
facie case may succeed in eliminating or at least narrowing the
scope of the resulting speculation, but if residual baseline risk
remains, then the result is both expert and jury speculation, not
the elimination of speculation.
Third, courts have obscured the paradox by invoking the prob-
abilistic standard of proof traditional in torts. Because the standard
of proof is the "preponderance of the evidence," or "more likely
than not," courts have tended to regard the relative size of the
defendant-caused category to the baseline category as critical to
deciding whether improper speculation is occurring. If the number
of estimated baseline risk cases is less than 50% of the total cases
(that is, the defendant-caused cases outnumber the baseline risk
cases), it is concluded that a jury could reasonably find that, "more
likely than not," the plaintiff's case falls into the defendant-caused
category. 6 If, however, the baseline risk is greater than 50%, the
courts wonder how any reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's
case is not in the baseline category.1 7 Thus, the legal significance
of the baseline risk paradox has been obscured further by the
notion that when the defendant-caused cases outnumber the base-
line risk cases, the plaintiff should clearly be allowed to get a jury
determination.
This approach to the paradox, however, is misleading. It is
fallacious, as previously noted,"' to suggest that the relative num-
judgment by producing expert testimony that the misdiagnosis "probably" or "more likely
than not" caused her husband's death. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment against the plaintiff, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
Where percentage probabilities and decreased probabilities are submitted
into evidence, there is simply no danger of speculation on the part of the jury.
More speculation is involved in requiring the medical expert to testify as to
what would have happened had the defendant not been negligent.
Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 478. In this quotation, the phrase "what would have happened had
the defendant not been negligent" is a reference, in part, to what this Article has defined
as baseline risk.
116 See, e.g., Harvey v. Silber, 2 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Mich. 1942) (approving charge to
jury that plaintiff need only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that surgery
"would with reasonable probability have saved his life"); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d
1280, 1283 (Pa. 1978) (containing expert testimony that decedent would have had 75%
chance of survival with proper treatment).
17 See, e.g., Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971)
(holding in wrongful death action, proximate cause is issue for jury "only if there is
sufficient evidence showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment, and surgery the patient
probably would have survived," where "probably" means "more likely than not" or "more
than 50% ' expectation of survival); see also King, supra note 13.
"8 See supra note 111.
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ber of defendant-caused and baseline risk cases either creates or
resolves the paradox. 119 Even when statistical data and expert tes-
timony are available, the baseline risk paradox can arise because
knowledge is incomplete, because it is not known which causal
factors brought about the particular plaintiff's injuries. There exists
an indeterminacy about whether the particular plaintiff's injury
was caused by the defendant's negligent act because the causal
systems at work in the plaintiff's particular case are not under-
stood.
Mr. Stubbs's case of typhoid fever was either caused by the
drinking of the water negligently contaminated by the defendant,
by some other, unrelated cause, or perhaps by some combination
of the defendant's act and the other causes. The ignorance, how-
ever, over what the actual causes were in Stubbs's situation is not
dispelled by noting the relative percentages of cases in each cate-
gory, or by assuming that the causal system actually at work is
accurately modeled by a random drawing. Such issues obviously
reach further into the realms of causation and probability than this
Article can venture in detail. It must be sufficient here to note the
paradox. No matter what level of scientific causal analysis is
achieved, the epistemologically arbitrary nature of the decision to
categorize the particular plaintiff's injury into the baseline risk
category or the defendant-created risk category is not eliminated
so long as a non-negligible baseline risk remains at that level of
analysis.
III. JUrIcIAL USE OF THE CONCEPT OF BASELINE RISK
With a refined understanding of the concept of baseline risk,
of the kinds of scientific evidence relevant to determining baseline
risk, and of the kinds of uncertainty associated with such a deter-
mination, this Article now turns to a discussion of the uses to
,,9 Even if only about thirty cases out of 150 are baseline risk cases, it is still not
known which causal factors were in fact responsible for the plaintiff's illness. See Falcon
v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Mich. 1990) ("To say that a patient would have
had a ninety-nine percent opportunity of survival if given proper treatment, does not mean
that the physician's negligence was the cause in fact if the patient would have been among
the unfortunate one percent who would have died."). This issue is not resolved by pointing
out that if we randomly drew only one case from the 150, we would probably draw a
defendant-caused one. It would make far more sense to be moved in such a case simply by
considerations of fairness. If defendant-caused cases outnumber baseline cases, it may seem




which the concept can fruitfully be put. The discussion here can
be only preliminary in nature because, as with most tools, concepts
often turn out to have many uses beyond those envisioned by those
that designed the concept. The intent here is simply to suggest the
probable usefulness of the concept by pointing the way toward a
number of uses that already can be anticipated.
This Part of the Article is divided into three subparts. The first
discusses the relevance of baseline risk to various elements of
traditional tort causes of action. The second examines burdens of
production with respect to baseline risk. It also addresses the
question of minimally sufficient evidence for establishing baseline
risk and explores the potential for resolving this question on a
motion for summary judgment or directed verdict. The third sub-
part discusses certain considerations that may affect the appropriate
allocation of the burden of persuasion with respect to baseline risk.
A. Relevance of Baseline Risk
1. Negligence
Throughout Parts I and II, the example of a negligence cause
of action was used. One of the clearest illustrations of the relevance
of baseline risk is with regard to determining whether a defendant
has been negligent. The quality of the defendant's act upon which
liability is predicated is its "negligence" or "carelessness," but
such acts are also often characterized as having created an "unrea-
sonable risk of harm" to the plaintiff.'2 If the negligent act of the
defendant is conceptualized as having created an incremental, "un-
reasonable" risk to the plaintiff, then the risk to which the defen-
dant has added is the baseline risk inherent in the situation.
Indeed, baseline risk is the inherent risk to the plaintiff exclu-
sive of the incremental risk created by the defendant's negligent
acts. Baseline risk is the floor or threshold risk, above which a
defendant must have created an incremental risk in order to be
found negligent. Thus, the relevance of baseline risk to negligence
- See, e.g., Cowart v. United States, 617 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding as a
necessary element for negligence cause of action in Florida "a duty requiring the actor to
conform to a certain standard of conduct for protection of others against unreasonable
risk"); Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (Ct. App.
1980) (holding that "real basis of negligence is not carelessness, but behavior which society
... views as involving unreasonable risk of harm to others"); RESTATEmENT (SEcONrD) OF
ToRTS §§ 281, 282 (1965).
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should be clear: the concept of negligence entails the concept of
baseline risk, and the establishment of actual negligence in a given
case presupposes the ability to distinguish the incremental risk
created by the defendant from the actual baseline risk.12 '
The "unreasonable" character of the incremental risk (the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of "negligent" acts) may also be deter-
mined in part by reference to baseline risk. When baseline risk is
low, even a relatively small increase in risk might be considered
negligent; but when baseline risk is already high, and the defendant
adds to it in only a de minimis way, negligence is less likely to be
found. 122 This is not the place to explicate an adequate concept of
negligence. That task requires an independent analysis of the ap-
propriate basis for liability. What is appropriate here, and in the
discussions of other tort concepts immediately below, is to indicate
the varied tasks for which courts or juries might turn to the concept
of baseline risk.
Related directly to determinations of negligence is the judicial
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In certain situations in which the
plaintiff is simply unable to establish through direct evidence any
specific negligent act of the defendant, the court will allow the
jury to infer that in such a situation the plaintiff's injury was
- This is clearest in those difficult cases that involve significant baseline risk, such as
the "lost chance" cases, see supra note 13, in which the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate
negligence at all is in part a function of the plaintiff's ability to identify and separate the
baseline risk inherent in the situation.
- Baseline risk is probably employed by the finder of fact in several ways in deter-
mining whether a defendant engaged in a negligent act. For example, in the collision case
involving the defendant crossing into the plaintiff's lane, the defendant's evidence might
show that a child ran suddenly into her lane, creating an emergency situation to which the
defendant reacted by swerving into plaintiff's lane. In coming to a conclusion about what
the "reasonable person would have done under similar circumstances," the trier of fact
probably takes into account, in some fashion, the fact that the emergency situation itself
increased the inherent, situational risk to the plaintiff, when compared to the risk to the
plaintiff in the absence of the emergency. A two lane road with cars approaching from
opposite directions is suddenly made riskier for all drivers, with respect to the risk of
collision and impact injuries, when a child races suddenly into the roadway. Human reactions
to children, delayed reaction times, and the panicky reactions of the split second all
contribute to creating a riskier-than-normal situation. The baseline risk of collision injury
in an emergency situation is higher than if no emergency existed. In such a case, the
emergency situation itself, considered without regard to any particular act of the defendant,
involved a higher risk for the plaintiff. The defendant should not be held liable for that
increase in the baseline risk. The defendant should merely be liable for any additional risk
(over the baseline risk) caused by defendant's negligence. The issue is whether this defendant,
under the circumstances, made an already riskier-than-normal situation even riskier than a
reasonably prudent driver would have.
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unlikely to occur in the absence of some unspecified negligent act
by the defendant.'2 In such cases, the baseline risk may be so low,
relative to the injury incidence that is expected when negligence
occurs, that the low baseline risk becomes relevant in helping to
conclude that the plaintiff's injury probably happened because the
defendant had been negligent. 124 In such cases, the judicial rule
against allowing juries to "speculate" about factual issues is thought
to be met in part because of the relatively low baseline risk.'5
11 See REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTS § 328D (1965); see also Spidle v. Steward,
402 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. 1980). Contrast with such cases a situation in which the baseline risk
is low, but the injury may have resulted from the "normal risks of the surgery," and "the
injury was of a kind that could occur despite the exercise of reasonable care"-that is, the
injury could as easily have occurred as a result of the baseline risk. See Forsmark v. State,
349 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Iowa 1984); Contreras v. St. Luke's Hospital, 144 Cal. Rptr. 647,
657 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding res ipsa loquitur instruction not warranted where sole expert
evidence was that resulting injury was rare). In the latter type of case, although res ipsa
does not apply, the plaintiff might still be able to show that the defendant's specific conduct
created an unreasonable incremental risk over the baseline risk, resulting in the plaintiff's
specific injury.
' See, e.g., Spidle, 402 N.E.2d at 218-20 (holding that if expert witness had answered
"no" when asked whether the injurious result would ordinarily result in the absence of
negligence, plaintiffs would have introduced sufficient evidence for the first prerequisite of
res ipsa loquitur). The objective here is simply to show that baseline risk is relevant to
traditional res ipsa loquitur determinations, not to explicate at this time a reconceptualized
set of criteria for res ipsa that properly uses the concept. Such a reconceptualization,
however, would be appropriate and useful.
',2 Baseline risk also enters into many determinations that a private nuisance exists. In
order to establish a private nuisance, it must be shown that there is an "unreasonable"
interference with the use and enjoyment of land. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
822 & cmt. k (1979); KEETON ET a., supra note 4, § 87, at 623, § 88, at 629-30. Involved
in the determination of what interference is unreasonable, however, is often the concept of
baseline risk. Cases sometimes involve determining whether the defendant added any risk
to the baseline risk of the relevant kind of injury. See, e.g., Doe v. Manheimer, 563 A.2d
699 (Conn. 1989) (involving question of whether crime risk in high crime area was increased
by allowing an overgrowth of bushes); Travis v. Moore, 377 So. 2d 609 (Miss. 1979)
(addressing risk of depression resulting from funeral parlor entering residential neighbor-
hood); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985)
(inquiring whether business interruption risk was'Increased by nearby railway car containing
ethylene oxide).
Indeed, the controversy over "moving to the nuisance" may be interpreted as princi-
pally about whether the defendant's activities should be included in the baseline risk in a
given situation. See, e.g., Desario v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., CA-8346, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3256 (Ct. App. June 24, 1991) (affirming order to certify class action in suit
presenting issue whether plaintiff who "moved to the nuisance," a landfill, assumed risk
of damage to his property); see also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875
(N.Y. 1970) (holding that because permanent damages were awarded to plaintiffs, subsequent
purchasers of plaintiffs' land would purchase with defendant's air pollution as part of risk
of living at that location).
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2. Contributory Negligence, Assumption of Risk, and
Comparative Fault
The issue of the defendant's negligence must be contrasted with
.the traditional defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk. Unlike the defendant's negligence, which creates risk in-
cremental to the baseline risk in the situation, the plaintiff's neg-
ligence is part of the baseline situation. At least in cases where
some carelessness on the part of the plaintiff led to the plaintiff's
being in the situation in which the plaintiff was injured, the risk
to the plaintiff created by her own actions is part of the baseline
risk. 126 Attempts to establish the plaintiff's contributory negligence
are really attempts by the defendant to establish that a significant
baseline risk existed. 127 By instituting the affirmative defenses, the
courts have elevated this plaintiff-created portion of baseline risk
(when it exists) to special legal significance.
Although claims by the defendant of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk both lead to determinations of (at least a
portion of) the baseline risk, the two defenses are conceptually
quite distinct. When a plaintiff is negligent (under a doctrine of
116 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418, 430 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
when plaintiff was injured while diving into lake in National Wildlife Refuge, plaintiff's
conduct was not merely minimally negligent but willful and wanton, and stating that plaintiff
"could have prevented the accident by just not diving"); Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods,
Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that, in truck driver's negligence action
against unloader for injuries sustained when log tumbled off truck while being unloaded,
jury should decide question of truck driver's contributory negligence in not ensuring proper
loading of logs and in not getting out of harm's way when he should have heard noise of
unloading).
'" Such cases are conceptually related to cases in which the plaintiff aggravates her
injuries after the tort is committed, or at least fails to mitigate the damages. See, e.g.,
Southport Transit Co. v. Avondale Marine Ways Inc., 234 F.2d 947, 951-52 (5th Cir. 1956)
(holding that doctrine of avoidable consequences, under which plaintiff is denied recovery
for those losses resulting from his failure to use reasonable efforts to avoid them, comes
into play when defendant has committed an actionable wrong and limits recovery by
disallowing only damages plaintiff could reasonably have averted); Kirby v. Larson, 256
N.W.2d 400, 416 (Mich. 1977) ("If plaintiff fails to use due care to prevent or reduce
damages subsequent to the injury complained of, he or she may not recover the enhanced
damages.").
The point here is not the familiar one that under a comparative fault scheme plaintiff's
fault in bringing about the accident and plaintiff's fault in failing to mitigate the conse-
quences of the accident become similar in function, insofar as each works to reduce the
percentage of the total damages for which the defendant is liable. Rather, the point is that
these two forms of defense predicated on the plaintiff's negligence are similar in that each
represents an effort by the defendant to identify (and thus escape liability for) plaintiff-
created portions of the total baseline risk.
[VOL. 80
1991-921 BASELNE RISK
either contributory negligence or comparative negligence), the
plaintiff is partially responsible, in a careless way, for the baseline
risk that existed in the situation.'2 Because the defendant should
not be held liable for any injuries resulting from baseline risks, it
is reasonable, a fortiori, that the defendant should no; compensate
the plaintiff for injuries traceable to the plaintiff's own negligence.
Thus, the doctrine of contributory or comparative negligence' 29
may be viewed simply as a corollary of the general principle of
non-compensation for injuries attributable to baseline risks.
Assumption of risk, however, presupposes a distinct state of
knowledge on the plaintiff's part-one that involves identifying
baseline risk as such. At issue in assumption of risk is whether the
plaintiff actually appreciated the difference between the baseline
risk in the particular situation (including any risk that might be
created by the plaintiff's own negligence), and the possible incre-
mental increase in risk due to the defendant's negligence. 130 The
'- Of course, there is nothing to prevent defining baseline risk to exclude the portion
of risk attributable to the plaintiff. This would conceptualize the total risk as having three
possible components: that due to the defendant, that due to the plaintiff, and the residual
or remaining risk. For tort cases, however, a tripartite conception would be unnecessarily
complicated because the plaintiff's negligence is not always at issue. Moreover, as discussed
in the text, there is no real reason to distinguish between the portions of baseline risk due
and not due to the plaintiff's negligence, because the plaintiff generally must bear the total
costs of injuries or risks not attributable to the defendant.
'29 There is a judicial and scholarly discussion over what is "compared" in a compar-
ative negligence judgment. Cf. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 915
F.2d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that doctrine of comparative negligence should be
used to assess liability in proportion to the cost to each party of avoiding the entire
accident), cert. denied, -U.S. -, III S. Ct. 1583 (1991); Burden v. Evansville
Materials, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1022, 1036 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (setting forth list of factors
considered by court in allocating comparative fault), aff'd, 840 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1988).
Compare Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1058 (comparing fault
of parties), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984) with Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex. 1984) (comparing causation). See generally Don B. Dobbs, Account-
ability and Comparative Fault, 47 LA. L. Rav. 939 (1987); Aaron D. Twerski, Market
Share-A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BRooK. L. Rav. 869 (1989). This discussion might
benefit from the introduction of the concept of baseline risk because a certain amount of
metaphysical hair-splitting might be avoided by adoption of the view that what should be
compared is contribution to total relevant risk (defendant's contribution versus baseline
risk).
,3 A variation on the requirement of actual knowledge of risk is the requirement
sometimes used that the plaintiff should have known of the risk in the sense that, if the
plaintiff had exercised ordinary or reasonable care, then the plaintiff would have been
aware of the risk. See, e.g., Edwards v. Hammond, 510 So. 2d 234 (Ala. 1987). Even in
such cases, however, the risk that is the focus of the analysis is the incremental risk created
by the defendant's negligence, not the baseline risk inherent in the situation absent the
defendant's negligence.
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better position would be that the plaintiff "assumes a risk" only
if the plaintiff appreciates and consents to accept the incremental,
unreasonable risk that might be created by the defendant.' 3' The
risk that the plaintiff is said to appreciate in "assuming the risk"
is not baseline risk, but rather incremental risk added by the
defendant.
In a reconceptualization of negligence theory that explicitly
incorporates baseline risk, the above difference between contribu-
tory or comparative negligence and assumption of risk might lead
to the conclusion that the former could be eliminated as superflu-
ous issues of fact, although the latter should be retained as a
legitimate defense. 32
3. Strict Liability for Conduct
With regard to strict tort liability for injuries proximately caused
by an abnormally dangerous activity, 3 the concept of baseline risk
is relevant to the concept and finding of an "abnormally dangerous
activity."'134 Whether the courts predicate their holdings on "non-
natural uses" of land, 35 the introduction onto the land of some-
thing that was not originally there, 3 6 or the creation of an unusual
M See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965).
12 See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972). The concept of baseline risk might also shed light on the
relevance of the distinction between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" assumption of risk.
Compare Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 289-91 (Wash. 1987) (holding that
jury is entitled to consider reasonable and unreasonable assumption of risk when appor-
tioning damages under comparative negligence scheme) with Segoviano v. Housing Auth.
of Stanislaus County, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that reasonable
implied assumption of risk does not reduce plaintiff's recovery). Perhaps both approaches
can at least agree on this: damages due to baseline risk (whether "reasonably" or "unrea-
sonably" created or "assumed" by the plaintiff) should not be apportioned to the defendant.
3 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 311-16 (V.D. Tenn.
1986), aff'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead,
368 N.E.2d 24, 27 (N.Y. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
234 For discussions of factors relevant to determining whether an activity is "abnormally
dangerous," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note
4, § 78, at 554-59.
23 See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); see also Peneschi v. National
Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W. Va. 1982) (discussing hypothetical of having elephants
parachute onto farmland for family entertainment).
236 See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (hydrocyanic gas for
cockroach extermination); Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Ct. App.




hazard given the surroundings13 7 baseline risk is usually a relevant
consideration. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 suggests a
risk/utility balancing for determining whether an activity is "ab-
normally dangerous," and this balancing is clearly to take place
through a consideration of "common usage" in the area and the
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it occurred. 38
The Restatement lists six factors to be considered by the court
in deciding whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. 13 9 Most
of these factors in fact relate to the degree to which the incremental
risk due to the activity is substantially higher than the baseline risk
absent the activity. If the relevant baseline risk for the area of the
activity is already high, then marginally increasing that risk by
engaging in some additional activity might not be subject to strict
liability. If the relevant baseline risk is low, however, courts are
more likely to hold an activity abnormally dangerous.Y°
4. Strict Liability for Products
Whether a product is "defective" in a legally significant sense
is a necessary element of strict liability for products. 141 Despite the
controversy over whether "defectiveness" should or should not be
" See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975) (phosphate
slimes in creek resulting from phosphate rock mining operation); State Dep't. of Envtl.
Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (mercury pollution in tidal estuary
resulting from defendant's mercury processing operation). A traditional area of application
has been dynamite or "blasting" cases. See, e.g., Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978); Alonso v. Hills, 214 P.2d 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
"I' See RESATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 (1977).
,19 For example, the Restatement lists as factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on.
Id.; see, e.g., Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 220-23 (Wash. 1977) (discussing
circumstances important to determination of ultrahazardous nature of activity).
,,0 See, e.g., T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1261 (N.J.
1991) (holding processing and disposal of radium abnormally dangerous and particularly
inappropriate in urban setting); Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 921 (Wash. 1991)
(holding fireworks display near large crowds abnormally dangerous).
' See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (formulating strict prod-
ucts liability for "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property").
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defined in terms of "unreasonable risk,"' 42 most would agree that
a product is "defective" only if use of it creates an incremental
risk over the baseline risk that would exist even if a non-defective
product were used. Many courts define the notion of "defect" in
terms of the product's being "more dangerous than an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended'or reasonably
foreseeable manner,"' 43 and others define "defect" with reference
to risk/benefit balancing 4 Under either definition, the risk created
by the particular product at issue must be incremental to the
baseline risk associated with using a non-defective product, in order
for the product to be considered defective. 4 5
142 Compare id. & cmt. g (predicating strict products liability upon product being in a
"defective" condition that is "unreasonably dangerous" to consumer) with Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153-1163 (Cal. 1972) (requiring plaintiff only to prove that product
contained a "defect," not that the defect made the product "unreasonably dangerous").
Both sides in this debate would seem to agree that the risk created by the product defect is
incremental to any baseline risk already present in the situation absent any defectiveness
(that is, risks from the use of such a product if the defect were absent). Cf. Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Or. 1974) (arguing that whether liability is
imposed under negligence, ultrahazardness, or strict liability, same process of weighing
utility against risk is employed; therefore courts use "the same language and concepts of
reasonableness" in determining "unreasonable danger" in products cases).
141 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489, 494
(Ohio 1988); REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) Or ToRTs § 402A cmt. g (1965) (defined product as in
defective condition if "in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer that will
be unreasonably dangerous to him"); id. cmt. i (defining product as "unreasonably dan-
gerous" if "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics").
I" See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
141 A good illustration of the principle that a defendant manufacturer is liable only for
creating incremental risks is provided by the doctrine that manufacturers must provide
"crashworthy" vehicles. In those cases, the reference situation defining the baseline risk is
a crash (not caused by the defendant), and the baseline risk is the injury normally associated
with such a crash absent a defective product. See Miller v. Todd, 551 N.E.2d 1139, 1142
(Ind. 1990) (recognizing the theory of crashworthiness for motorcycles, and quoting with
approval Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968) ("IT]he
manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the
defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred
as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design.")).
In design defect cases, many jurisdictions require that the plaintiff, as part of her
prima facie case, produce evidence of an alternative, non-defective design that would have
avoided the plaintiff's accident. See, e.g., Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d
516, 519 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 494 A.2d 939 (Md. 1985). In such a case, the
plaintiff is asking the jury to determine the baseline risk as that associated with using a




Whether the cause of action sounds in negligence or strict
liability, liability is generally not imposed unless the negligent act,
abnormally dangerous activity, or product defect is demonstrated
to be a cause of the plaintiff's injury.'4 The two traditional for-
mulations of the cause-in-fact connection required for liability are
"but for" causation 47 and "substantial factor" causation. 14 Both
formulations presuppose a notion of baseline risk.
First, in requiring that the defendant's negligent act (or the
product defect) be shown to be the "but for" cause of the plain-
tiff's injury, the courts are requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate
that her injury did not result from the baseline situation. In other
words, the plaintiff must show that absent the defendant's negligent
act, the plaintiff's injury would: not have occurred. 49
1' A significant relaxation of the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating cause-in-fact has
occurred in the adoption by some courts of market-share liability. See, e.g., Sindell v.
Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). At least one
court has provided a rationale for imposing market-share liability on the basis of the "over-
all risk produced," or "the amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-
at-large." Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 944 (1989). One court has declined to adopt a "risk-modified market share" approach,
at least in the context of DPT vaccine. Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 513-14
(N.J. 1989) (defining "risk-modified market share" as allocating liability based on "the
percentage of the potential risk to the plaintiff caused by each manufacturer of the prod-
uct").
141 See KFnroN Er AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 266; see also Ratliff v. Duke Power Co.,
151 S.E.2d 641, 648 (N.C. 1966) (defining "but for" cause of another event as a cause
without which the second event would not have taken place).
141 See, e.g., REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, §§ 431-33 (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 4, § 41, at 266-68; see also State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 726-28 (Alaska 1972) ("[I]f
two forces are operating to cause the injury, one due to defendant's negligence and the
other not, and each force is sufficient to cause the injury, defendant's negligence may be
found to be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.").
141 In reaching the conclusion that the defendant's actions were in fact the "but-for"
cause of the plaintiff's injury, the trier of fact probably often proceeds on the basis of
some inference that the risk of the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff would have been
significantly less under the circumstances, absent the negligent behavior by the defendant.
See, e.g., Winstead v. Ed's Live Catfish & Seafood, Inc., 554 So. 2d 1237 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (noting that chances of developing septicemia, as plaintiff did from eating raw oysters,
depends on number of oysters consumed, virulence of strain of bacteria present, strength
of body's immune system, presence of a liver disease, and other underlying risk factors;
since plaintiff did not know he had any of the underlying risk factors and had previously
eaten raw oysters with no ill effects, failure to warn plaintiff of dangers was not "cause in
fact" of plaintiff's harm), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 570 (La. 1990). The central importance
of such inferences, although perhaps not obvious in garden-variety collision cases, becomes
clear in cases involving injuries with normally high background incidence, such as cancer
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On the other hand, in requiring that the defendant's negligent
act be a "substantial factor" in bringing about the plaintiff's
injury, the courts are requiring a showing that the defendant's act
played a significant causal role in bringing about the injury-a role
in addition to the causal factors already at work in the baseline
situation. Thus, a logical and evidentiary relationship exists be-
tween baseline risk and what is often called "cause-in-fact."' ' 50
Beyond cause-in-fact, there is also a logical relationship be-
tween baseline risk and the notion that the causal chain must also
be sufficiently "proximate." Even if a defendant's negligent act is
a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, courts traditionally have
required that the causal connection be sufficiently "foreseeable"
or "direct," so that imposing legal liability cannot be regarded as
unfair or unacceptably open-ended. 51 Some potentially trouble-
some cases that traditionally have been resolved by appealing to
the lack of proximity in the causal chain might be resolvable
alternatively by reference to baseline risk. For example, an appeal
to "unforeseeability" might be in part an assertion that the incre-
mental risk (expected loss) created by the defendant's act was not
sufficiently above a reasonable estimate of baseline risk determin-
able at the time of that act, so that the defendant should be relieved
of liability. In other words, foreseeability of harm might be seen
as a function of the determinable difference between the expected
loss and a reasonable estimate of baseline risk. If the causal con-
nection was so remote and tenuous that the expected loss (risk)
would have appeared negligible relative to the expected baseline
or infectious diseases. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1260 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that with time, the number of confounding factors increases),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988); Rosenberg, supra
note 106, at 857-58 (noting two versions of preponderance rule on causation, probability).
In such cases, the trier of fact must determine and take into account the baseline risk in
order to decide whether the defendant's actions in fact caused the plaintiff's illness. Cf.
Caazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 597-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (involving
injuries sustained in rear end automobile collision, and issue of allocation as between
negligent driving of overtaking motorist, allegedly defective door handle design, and plain-
tiffs' failure to wear seat belts), aff'd in part, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
110 See KETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 41, at 266-68. Just as the concept of baseline
risk may prove useful in helping to refine the legal concept of "unreasonable risk," by
providing a well-defined threshold of risk to which unreasonable risk is incremental, baseline
risk may also prove useful in explicating the concept of "substantial factor." Many of the
same factors that render an incremental risk "unreasonable" may also render a causal
contribution "substantial." And, perhaps an incremental risk should be substantial in order
to be unreasonable.
"I KEETON ET A., supra note 4, § 42, at 272-80.
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risk, and would have seemed to merge with it, then perhaps the
causal chain was not a "proximate" one. In any case, it seems
plausible that when courts decide the foreseeability of the harm,
they are at least implicitly taking into account the extent to which
the likely result of a defendant's actions tended to be indistinguish-
able, ex ante, from the expected baseline risk.
6. Damages
As a final illustration of the relevance of the concept of baseline
risk in tort litigation, it is worth noting that the notion of baseline
risk is routinely used in determining the appropriate amount of
damages once a defendant is held liable. Damage awards for un-
intentional torts are primarily compensatory in nature, having the
objective of placing the plaintiff in a position equivalent to the
one she was in prior to the tortious injury. 5 2 Baseline risk is taken
into account whenever courts place a ceiling on damage amounts
owed by the defendant because to some extent the injury would
have occurred anyhow, even absent the defendant's negligence. In
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative,'53 for example, the court
pointed out that damages for a misdiagnosis of cancer "should be
awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages
caused directly by premature death, such as lost earnings and
additional medical expenses, etc. ' 154 Whenever compensatory dam-
ages are limited by the life expectancy of the plaintiff, taking into
account the characteristics and risk factors of that particular plain-
tiff, then all risks of death other than defendant's negligence are
integrated in the life expectancy. 5  Life expectancy, therefore, is
an integrated function of all other life-threatening risk factors of
the plaintiff, including those present in the reference situation (the
baseline risk).
2 RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 901 & cmt. a (1979).
" 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
" Id. at 479; see King, supra note 13, at 1382 (noting that base value on patient's
life should reflect such factors as age, health, and earning potential, taking into account
that patient had suffered heart attack).
M' Cf. DOBSS, supra note 32, at 571-73 (noting that because mortality tables, which
attempt to show average future life at any given age, are based on experience with particular
groups of people, such as those that purchase life insurance or annuity policies, courts
usually permit testimony showing good or bad health of particular plaintiff or decedent, or
other facts that tend to increase or decrease the individual's life expectancy).
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7. Conclusion on Relevance
In connection with each of the above examples, the law of
torts is clearly interested in identifying the incremental risk for
which the defendant is responsible, in contrast to the baseline risk.
Establishing the existence and magnitude of the baseline risk is
therefore relevant in various ways to establishing liability under
these traditional tort concepts. In addition, rethinking various con-
cepts and liability doctrines by utilizing the concept of baseline risk
might lead to useful reformulations of the traditional elements of
the tort causes of action. For example, if in a comparative fault
context the finder of fact were told to allocate percentages of fault
based on a comparison of the incremental unreasonable risk created
by the defendant's negligent act with the baseline risk inherent in
the situation, then such a formulation would avoid many of the
nearly metaphysical puzzles about what is being compared. 156 Such
reevaluations would have to take into account the specific problems
and policies to which the traditional solutions have been responsive
and would have to determine whether proposed reformulations
would meet those needs more effectively and efficiently. Such
extensive investigations are beyond the scope of this Article. What
must suffice here is merely to suggest the usefulness of a well-
defined concept of baseline risk in such reevaluations.
B. Meeting Burdens of Production with Sufficient Evidence
It might seem at first that introducing the concept of baseline
risk raises no novel issues of burden of production. At least in the
absence of any reformulations of the traditional factual elements
of a cause of action, it might seem that if baseline risk is relevant
to a traditional element (such as negligence, product defect, or
contributory fault), then the burden of producing sufficient evi-
dence on baseline risk should fall on that party that traditionally
bore that burden for the relevant element. For example, because
the plaintiff bears the burden of production on whether the defen-
dant acted negligently, then it might seem that the plaintiff should
bear the burden of establishing the baseline risk to the extent that
"1 See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1979) (discussing
"the current conceptual confusion among the courts, and the difficulties confronting us in
comparing plaintiff's personal conduct with the strict liability of the defendant for his
product defect"); supra note 129.
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doing so is necessary in order to establish that the defendant has
created an unreasonable risk of harm.
Although this general principle provides a reasonable starting
place, it should be recognized that three somewhat new issues do
arise once baseline risk is taken seriously. First, because baseline
risk has seldom received explicit attention, there is some question
of how much and what kind of evidence it is reasonable to expect
a party to produce. Second, the explicit recognition of the inherent
potential for different kinds of uncertainty in determining baseline
risk leads to the question of which party should bear what burden
of production on resolving or determining the associated uncer-
tainty. Finally, because baseline risk is the aggregate risk created
by many causal agencies (including the plaintiff, persons not party
to the litigation, and purely natural causes), it might not always
be so clear that the party with the traditional burden of production
for a particular element should automatically shoulder a similar
burden for baseline risk. While comprehensive discussion of these
considerations must await the reevaluation of each traditional ele-
ment, a few general remarks are possible here under each topic.
1. Nature of the Evidence
To a great extent, traditional tort litigation has succeeded in
avoiding explicit consideration of baseline risk because juries have
been relied on to bring to the litigation their own experience with
the reference situation and to draw upon their own experience to
intuit a sufficiently accurate estimate of baseline risk. But unless
the reference situation is extremely commonplace and the baseline
risk intuitable, the experience samples of the jurors are likely to
be unrepresentative, because those experiences are necessarily con-
venience samples-the happenstance and anecdotal experiences of
individuals. Moreover, jurors are not in general trained to evaluate
the representativeness of those experiences or to reach accurate
conclusions about resulting risks. In many lawsuits, there will be
no sound evidentiary basis for even deciding whether a juror's
experience does provide a generalizable sample of the reference
situation, let alone for evaluating the probable sampling error
associated with any juror's conclusion (or any jury's collective
conclusion) about baseline risk.
The function of expert witnesses is, of course, to educate the
jury concerning matters beyond its experience. When an expert is
needed with respect to baseline risk, the kind of expert required is
one whose personal experience, specialized training, or research
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provides information about the baseline risk associated with the
reference situation. To the extent needed in the case, an expert's
testimony about baseline risk should include testimony about the
kinds of inherent uncertainty discussed in Part II. 157 The expert
might be required to present sufficient evidence concerning the
conceptual, measurement, modeling, sampling, and causal uncer-
tainty inherent in the expert's estimate of the baseline risk, so that
the trier of fact can decide whether such uncertainties are within
acceptable limits. 58 In the proper case, failure to produce evidence
on important uncertainties might constitute grounds for excluding
the testimony or directing a verdict.
2. Reducing Uncertainty
The question also arises whether, simply because a party has
the burden of production on the issue of baseline risk, that party
should also have the burden of producing evidence to reduce every
kind of associated uncertainty to acceptable levels. As an example,
assume that Mr. Stubbs, in his negligence action, 59 has the burden
of producing evidence that the baseline risk was sufficiently deter-
minable so that, more likely than not, the defendant created an
incremental, unreasonable risk. It would seem to be a sensible
policy to require Stubbs to provide evidence, in the form of em-
pirical data, that the baseline risk of typhoid fever encountered
simply by being a resident of Rochester does not reasonably ac-
count for the number of cases observed in Rochester in 1910.
Using today's statistical techniques, Stubbs would need to offer
evidence that: (a) the data presented are for the appropriate public
health variables (conceptual uncertainty is within reasonable
bounds); (b) the. data are reasonably valid and reliable (measure-
117 The question here is not the weight of the testimony or evidence, of course, but
only what constitutes minimal sufficiency so that a reasonable jury could make a sufficiently
accurate determination of baseline risk.
"I What precisely those "acceptable limits" are has not been well analyzed within the
law-other than to hold that the overall conclusions as to the factual predicates for liability
must be established as "more likely than not." The proper interpretation of this phrase
and the question whether each factual issue must be independently established as "more
likely than not" are matters of some controversy. See L. JONATHAN COHEN, Tn PROBABLE
AND THE PROVABLE 58-67 (1977); L. Jonathan Cohen, The Logic of Proof, 1980 Cans. L.
REv. 91, 95-97; Sir Richard Eggleston, The Probability Debate, 1980 CRw. L. R v. 678,
682-85; Glanville Williams, The Mathematics of Proof, 1979 Cnm. L. Rv. 340, 340-42.
This problem of what kind and extent of uncertainty to accept in tort law is not
peculiar to baseline risk, however, and must be left for another day.
"I See supra text accompanying notes 66-69, 104-105.
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ment uncertainty); and, (c) the relative risk or odds ratio associated
with the incidence of typhoid fever in Stubbs's situation is statis-
tically significantly elevated over what one would expect in that
situation, even allowing for chance variation from year to year
(modeling and sampling uncertainty).
Having produced evidence that meets these enumerated con-
cerns, perhaps the plaintiff, in at least some circumstances, should
be allowed to take her case to a jury. Noticeably absent might be
evidence on the etiology (possible routes of causation) of typhoid
fever due to causes other than the defendant's negligence. But what
if in fact little or nothing were known about that etiology? Would
it be sound public policy to hold the plaintiff's case hostage to
that kind of scientific advance, even when descriptive evidence of
increased risk is available?
If the defendant wished to rebut the claim that Stubbs's case
of typhoid fever was more likely due to drinking the defendant's
contaminated water than to other causal factors normally encoun-
tered by residents of Rochester, he could attack Stubbs's data (as
being inappropriate, invalid, or unreliable) or Stubbs's sampling
or modeling, or he could go further by trying to identify some
particular causal agent other than the contaminated water that was
as likely to be at work in Stubbs's case. In effect, this is the
conclusion reached by the court of appeals in Stubbs, which held
that the plaintiff did not have to rule out every possible cause as
not being operative in his case. 160
Beyond relying on the defendant's natural interest in rebutting
a prima facie case, a court might place an affirmative burden of
production on the defendant concerning causal factors other than
the defendant's negligence, once the plaintiff has provided suffi-
cient evidence that the risk to him created by the defendant was
statistically significantly increased over the baseline risk. Such a
burden of production would help ensure that whatever scientific
information on causation is available would be placed before the
jury, so that causal uncertainty could be evaluated. Moreover, to
the extent that uncertainty reduction is the objective, it might make
sense to require the party with the greatest or cheapest access to
risk information to produce evidence on causal uncertainty.
Resolution of these issues depends on policy concerns about
who should bear the cost of generating what information and who
,60 See Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y. 1919).
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should bear the loss if little is known about baseline risk. Once
the kinds of inherent uncertainties are understood, those policy
concerns may lead to a different allocation of burdens of produc-
tion for different kinds of uncertainty. At a minimum, what can
be drawn from the above discussion is that the various kinds of
scientific uncertainty associated with determinations of baseline risk
need not be dealt with uniformly, when the issue is which party
should bear the burden of production.
3. Traditional Allocations
The above discussion should also caution against applying the
general principle that the party traditionally bearing the burden of
production with respect to a factual element should also automat-
ically bear the burden of production with respect to baseline risk,
when establishing such risk is relevant to establishing that factual
element. In the illustration above, although the plaintiff tradition-
ally bears the burden of production on negligence and proximate
cause, there might be reasons to regard a primarily statistical
showing by the plaintiff as sufficient for a prima facie case, and
even for thereafter imposing a burden of production on the defen-
dant with regard to alternative means of causation. If taking base-
line risk and its associated uncertainties seriously leads to
reformulating altogether at least some aspects of traditional tort
causes of actions, more precise questions about burdens of pro-
duction and sufficiency of evidence will be asked, and more useful
and informative answers may be forthcoming.
C. Allocating the Burden of Persuasion
The possibility that taking baseline risk seriously will lead to
reformulating at least some traditional concepts and doctrines leads
to consideration of the possibility that such reformulations may
also lead to reallocations of the burden of persuasion. The discus-
sion just above provides a suggestion on point. If in certain kinds
of cases, like Stubbs, a plaintiff's prima facie case were to be met
by an essentially statistical showing, then the question arises what
the jury should be told about what each party has to prove. Should
jury instructions remain couched in the traditional concepts, be-
cause of their supposedly intuitive appeal, or should the trier of
fact be instructed with more precise, but perhaps more difficult,
concepts? Is the concept of baseline risk, whatever its merits in
helping the court to decide motions on evidentiary relevance and
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sufficiency of evidence, necessarily helpful in having a jury arrive
at a legally correct determination? And if the concept of baseline
risk were utilized in jury instructions, who would have the burden
of persuasion on what the baseline risk is? Traditionally, the vague
notion of "normal risk" has been imparted to the jury in nearly
subliminal ways, by leaving it implicit in such phrases as "ordinary
care," "under similar circumstances," and "proximate cause."
Essential to the task of reevaluating the traditional elements of
liability is deciding whether traditional instructions are practically
useful, or whether they are more likely to produce jury determi-
nations of factual issues that are unacceptably wide of the mark. 161
Taking baseline risk seriously may also introduce more precise
questions about how best to allocate the burden of persuasion and
the risk of not dispelling uncertainty about baseline risk. Perhaps
one consideration should be which party is the "best uncertainty
optimizer": the party in the best position to decide whether it is
economically sensible to incur the costs of generating and assem-
bling the information needed to reduce uncertainty further.162 One
goal is to minimize the administrative and transactional costs of
litigation, through optimizing the level of uncertainty reduction
given the stakes in the litigation. When the plaintiff has unique
access to information about the true costs of the injury and the
circumstances of the accident, and has discovery tools available
with which to learn about causation, placing the burden on the
plaintiff makes good sense. But perhaps the risk of non-persuasion
should be placed on the defendant in certain cases where the
plaintiff is not the "cheapest uncertainty reducer," or "best un-
certainty optimizer." Something like this is probably at work in
such cases as Ybarra v. Spangard,161 in which the defendant medical
personnel involved in the plaintiff's operation were given the bur-
den of exonerating themselves. In effect, the defendants were given
the burden of establishing that some baseline factor in fact caused
the plaintiff's injury. Focusing attention on a well-defined concept
of baseline risk may lead to more fruitful formulations of the
" This question may have different answers depending upon whether no expert testi-
mony is needed or presented in the case (the jury is capable of intuitively estimating baseline
risk), or whether expert testimony has been presented and the jury would benefit from
judicial guidance on how to determine its relevance and probative value. See supra note 44.
162 This suggestion obviously follows the paradigm established in torts analysis by Dean
Guido Calabresi. See CALABRnsI, supra note 63, at 135-61.
M' 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944).
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precise issues in such cases, and to rationales for fairer and more
efficient allocations of the burden of persuasion.
CONCLUSION
A vague notion of "normal risk" is fundamental in tort law.
A basic principle of torts is that the defendant should not be liable
for injuries that result from the normal risks of life, or from those
situational risks to the plaintiff that are not fairly chargeable to
the defendant. Because this principle is so fundamental, the notion
of normal risk is implicit in many of the concepts used and deter-
minations made by judges and juries in assessing liability, and is
involved when addressing such issues as negligence, abnormally
dangerous activities, product defectiveness, contributory fault, as-
sumption of risk, and proximate cause. This Article has tried to
clarify what is meant by "normal risk" by defining a concept of
baseline risk that is designed to be useful in tort litigation.
In designing this concept, and in refining the understanding of
its use by exploring the kinds of uncertainties necessarily associated
with determinations of baseline risk in individual cases, this Article
has also laid a conceptual foundation for redefining, or at least
refining, other central concepts of tort liability law. In such rede-
finitions, there is the opportunity to make tort theory more re-
sponsive to the growing need for a unified theory of accident law.
Such a unified theory should bring together retrospective tort ad-
judication and prospective administrative rulemaking, by formu-
lating a single substantive and procedural framework that is useful
in achieving both compensatory and regulatory goals, and in facil-
itating interactive fact-finding and policy making. Such a unified
theory should also create a bridge between the concepts of the law
and the concepts of the sciences, so that the latter can be used by
decision makers to make legal decisions that are more efficient and
more effective. A cornerstone in such a unified theory of accident
law is a well-defined and well understood concept of baseline risk.
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